










































Risk and the Privatisation of Uzbekistan’s Cotton Sector
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ABOUT THE SERIES 
Drawing on the systematic 
methodologies behind investigative 
journalism, open source intelligence 
gathering, big-data, criminology, and 
political science, this series maps the 
transnational corporate, legal and 
governmental structures employed by 
organisations and figures in Central 
Asia to accumulate wealth, influence 
and political power. The findings will 
be analysed from a good governance, 
human rights, and democratic 
perspective, to draw out the big 
picture lessons. 
Each instalment will feature a digestible 
analytical snapshot centring on a 
particular thematic, individual, or 
organisation, delivered in a format that 
is designed to be accessible to the public, 
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Cotton is historically one of Uzbekistan’s most important exports. It is also the country’s 
most contentious commodity. To pick the vast quantities of cotton, millions of people 
have been forced by the state to labour in unsanitary and unsafe conditions. 
This has prompted an expansive 
domestic and international human rights 
campaign, and an international pledge 
by major apparel brands not to source 
cotton tainted by forced labour. In 
response, the Mirziyoyev government 
has committed to eradicating forced 
labour from cotton production in 
Uzbekistan. 
The centre-piece of its strategy is 
a rapid privatisation of the cotton 
sector through a system of vertically 
integrated clusters. Operated by private 
companies, cotton clusters aim to turn 
raw cotton into value added textiles for 
domestic markets and export. During 
2017/18, 63 clusters were formally 
created through government decree, 
covering 501,614 hectares of land. 
It is anticipated that clusters will 
prime productivity gains and tackle 
the drivers of forced labour.
However, the rapid privatisation and 
corporatisation of the cotton sector 
comes with serious risks. Weaknesses 
in corporate governance and market 
integrity has permitted white-collar 
crime to thrive in the upper stratums of 
Uzbekistan’s private sector, a process 
that frequently occurs under the 
protection, or with the connivance of, 
state agencies. 
This has deterred foreign investment 
and damaged Uzbekistan’s 
international standing.
The International Labour Organization 
predicts that the cluster system’s 
economic promise depends on the 
inclusion of ‘responsible agricultural 
investors’.1
This report is based on a year-long 
investigation into the integrity of the 
cluster system and the companies 
selected to operate it.
Following the first iteration of this 
research, a corporate integrity 
scorecard was developed to identify 
risk in the cluster system. Green flags 
are awarded where a corporate actor 
exhibits traits associated with good 
practice, amber flags are awarded 
where there is an absence of key data, 
while red flags are attributed when 
evidence is identified of bad practice. 
A systematic application of the 
scorecard to a sample of 20 clusters 
revealed a high proportion of red 
(41%) and amber flags (49%). This 
indicates the cotton cluster system is 
at significant risk of abusive practices. 
Green flags (10%) were almost entirely 
earned by one cluster operator, 
Indorama Kokand Textile.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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 Uztex is a family owned conglomerate 
that directly operates five clusters, 
and claims to be the largest textile 
firm in Uzbekistan. The same family 
owns a major stake in Invest Finance 
Bank, a private financial institution 
previously associated with Gulnara 
Karimova, the imprisoned eldest 
daughter of Uzbekistan’s late 
President, Islam Karimov.
 Shares in Uztex group companies 
are held through a complex offshore 
structure that spans Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and Singapore. 
These offshore legal entities use 
nominee companies and individuals – 
some of whom have been tied to 
international money laundering 
scandals – which serves to publicly 
conceal Uztex group’s beneficial 
owners and persons with significant 
control. Evidence indicates that 
some of these offshore entities 
have potentially filed misleading 
information on the financial scope 
of the group’s operations. 
 Media reports claim that a key 
controlling mind behind the Uztex 
group is Farkhod Mamatdjanov. 
Evidence collected for this case 
study, which includes leaked internal 
documents, support these claims.
 The General Director of Russia’s 
Pyatigorsk Dairy Plant LLC, a 
company previously part-owned by 
an Uztex offshore holding company, 
alleges that Farkhod Mamatdjanov 
is involved in criminal activity, 
operating with protection from 
employees within Uzbekistan’s 
Prosecutor General’s office.  
 Farkhod Mamatdjanov recently had 
an investment frozen by the Russian 
courts over concerns tied corporate 
property was being employed in the 
service of organised crime activity. 
This court order was prompted 
by a criminal investigation into 
Mamatdjanov launched by Russian 
authorities.
 Leaked Uztex records document 
a set of irregular transactions 
between Uztex group companies, 
Rieter, a major Swiss multinational 
that supplies industrial equipment 
for the textile sector, and an English 
Limited Liability Partnership,  
Wayrex LLP. 
In-depth case studies were conducted on two major business groupings 
responsible for 11 clusters. This research uncovered serious evidence 
of improper corporate conduct. 
Diagram 1: Green, amber and red flags 







THE FIRST CASE STUDY FOCUSES ON THE UZTEX GROUP. KEY FINDINGS INCLUDE:
FINDINGS
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 Russian national, Agadzhan Avanesov, 
and his reported assistant Vakhid 
Artykov, are tied through the 
Uzbekistani company Beshariq 
Tekstil JSC to resident of Kyrgyzstan, 
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov, and his son 
Murat Yakubzhanov. Beshariq 
Tekstil JSC operates the Beshariq 
cotton cluster in Uzbekistan. Murat 
Yakubzhanov also has an interest in 
five additional Uzbekistani clusters 
through the Textile Technologies 
Group, and its subsidiary 
Amudaryotex LLC (during 2019 
Amudaryotex shares were transferred 
from an entity owned by Mirakbar 
Yakubzhanov, to one owned by  
Murat Yakubzhanov).
 A Novaya Gazeta investigation 
accuses Agadzhan Avanesov of 
masterminding a major financial 
fraud through Starbank when he 
was Chairman and part-owner. 
The report claims bank funds were 
loaned out recklessly to companies 
owned or shadow owned by 
Starbank’s controllers. These 
loans were not paid back.
 Russia’s Deposit Insurance Agency 
(DIA) claims Avanesov knowingly 
formed bad debts, and failed to 
prevent Starbank’s bankruptcy. 
It has successfully petitioned the 
courts to seize Avanesov’s Moscow 
apartment, as part of a broader legal 
action which aims to hold the bank’s 
controllers personally to account for 
the loss of deposit holder moneys.
 Following Starbank’s bankruptcy, 
the DIA has also successfully 
litigated against Uzbekistani 
companies, Amudaryotex LLC and 
Beshariq Tekstil JSC. Both companies 
guaranteed major loans made by 
Starbank to tied entities in Russia, 
which were defaulted on. Under 
current currency conversation 
rates these loans amount to 
approximately US$21 million.
 Mirakbar Yakubzhanov claims to  
be a resident of Kyrgyzstan, with 
a registered UK office. Murat 
Yakubzhanov is a director at the 
state-owned Uzpromstroybank, 
and claims to be a partner at Grant 
Thornton Uzbekistan. Avanesov is 
based in Switzerland where he 
allegedly owns significant real-estate. 
Media reports from 2019 claim he 
is wanted by criminal authorities in 
Russia over the Starbank scandal.
 Avanesov denies involvement in the 
Beshariq cotton cluster. He denies 
knowledge of ongoing investigations 
into Starbank. He denies owning 
shares in Starbank. Avanesov also 
states he has won a US$1.33 million 
damages claim against Mirakbar 
Yakubzhanov in Switzerland’s 
Federal Court.
THE SECOND IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY INVOLVES A NUMBER OF INTERCONNECTED 
COMPANIES OPERATING SIX COTTON CLUSTERS. KEY FINDINGS INCLUDE:
IN ADDITION TO THE CONDUCT 
DOCUMENTED IN THE TWO IN-DEPTH 
CASE STUDIES THIS REPORT FINDS A 
CONCERNING NUMBER OF RED FLAGS 
ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER CLUSTER 
OPERATORS. THESE RED  FLAGS INCLUDE:
 The use of opaque offshore structures 
featuring nominees implicated in 
fraud and money laundering.
 The involvement of politically exposed 
persons in the managerial and 
ownership structures of cluster 
operators.
 The involvement of executives 
previously implicated in serious 
misconduct or white collar crime.
 Media reports linking cluster 
operators to fraud, corruption,  
and labour and farmer abuses.
 A lack of financial or corporate 
transparency.
 Irregular corporate filings.
 Requests for basic corporate 
information were sent to 19 cluster 
operators. No reply was received.
The report also finds that the dangers 
associated with this corporate risk 
environment are exacerbated by the 
cluster system’s governance structures. 
In particular cluster operators are 
selected in an opaque manner. There  
appear to be no significant public 
reporting requirements. The government 
has violated its own transparency 
laws by not responding when basic 
lawful requests have been made for 
information on the cluster system. 
Furthermore, clusters remain closely 
entwined with regional governments, 
and appear to enjoy certain monopoly 
powers over farms included in their 
cluster region. 
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TO ADDRESS THESE CHALLENGES 
AT A GENERAL LEVEL, KEY 
RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE:
 Maintain a public register for 
incorporated legal entities that 
includes all historical and current 
filings relating to shareholdings, 
office holders, corporate governance, 
and financial returns. Require 
incorporated entities to declare 
beneficial owners and persons with 
significant control on a public register.
 Reform the companies law to 
strengthen reporting requirements, 
director’s duties, and other 
mechanisms that can assure 
responsible business conduct. 
 Systematically enforce laws 
requiring public agencies to 
transparently and competitively 
procure private actors wishing 
to bid for government business, 
or to benefit from government 
administered business opportunities. 
 Ensure all procurement processes, 
and their outcomes, are published 
on a single unified database that is 
accessible to the public and clearly 
sign-posted.
 Strengthen due diligence capacity 
and processes within government 
to ensure integrity when selecting 
businesses to benefit from state-
aid, state procurement, or state 
facilitated/initiated projects.
 Enforce legal rights to information 
and freedom of expression. 
IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THESE GENERAL 
REFORMS, RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE COTTON CLUSTER  
SYSTEM INCLUDE:
 Ensure all cluster operators are 
selected on an open, transparent and 
competitive basis, with the selection 
process and outcomes published 
online in a form that is accessible 
to the public.
 Conduct rigorous due diligence 
during the selection process, to 
ensure only investors with a proven 
track record of responsible conduct 
are considered to operate clusters.
 Maintain rigorous oversight of 
cluster operators, looking at 
business performance, corporate 
integrity, labour relations, and 
environmental impact. Publish online 
all reviews of clusters, and the 
system more widely. 
 Monitor regional monopolies enjoyed 
by cluster operators to ensure no 
abuse of power. 
 Strengthen tenure rights of farmers, 
and circumscribe the involvement 
of regional government and the 
Prosecutor-General in cluster 
operations. 
 Incentivise cluster operators to meet 
international best practice with 
respect to transparency, corporate 
governance and social responsibility.
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2 Djanibekov, U. and Finger, R. (2018) ‘Agricultural risks and farm land consolidation process in transition countries: The case of cotton production  
in Uzbekistan’, Agricultural Systems, 164, 223-235; Trevisani, T. (2007) ‘After the Kolkhoz: Rural elites in competition’, Central Asian Survey,  
26:1, 85-104.
3 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights’ annual monitoring report details human rights abuses documented during the cotton harvest,  
see https://www.uzbekforum.org/category/reports/reports-only-cotton/(accessed 20 April 2020)
4 Muradov, B. and Ilkhamov, A. (2014) ‘Uzbekistan’s cotton sector: Financial flows and distribution of resources’, Working Paper, Open Society 
Foundations, October, p.18, available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/ddbf43f7-1528-4b79-a61d-94ee36f808c9/
uzbekistans-cotton-sector-20141021.pdf (accessed 8 October 2019)
IINVESTIGATING THE COTTON CLUSTER SYSTEMPART I
Cotton has historically been one of Uzbekistan’s most significant exports, a tradition that 
stretches back to the Soviet era.2 It is also the country’s most contentious commodity. 
To pick the vast quantities of cotton, millions of people have been forced by the state to 
labour in unsanitary and unsafe conditions.3 The profits from this illicitly run industry 
have reportedly been managed through an opaque public fund, Selkhozfond. Muradov and 
Ilkhamov observe, ‘the Selkhozfond is one of the least transparent institutions of public 
finance in the country’.4
BACKGROUND 
PART I.I
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After President Islam Karimov’s death in 
2016, his successor Shavkat Mirziyoyev 
pivoted towards an official policy 
prohibiting forced labour in the cotton 
sector. While this policy has yet to be 
fully realised in practice, labour monitors 
are documenting positive change.5 
During 2017/18 the Mirziyoyev 
government revealed its long-term 
plan for economically transforming 
the cotton sector, and tackling the 
structural drivers of forced labour.6  
Echoing a wider strategic pattern, the 
Uzbekistani government has proposed 
privatising raw cotton production, 
and vertically integrating cotton into 
textile manufacturing through a ‘cotton 
cluster’ system. 
Cotton clusters refer to regionally 
located value-added production chains 
where raw cotton is processed and 
turned into textile products for domestic 
markets and export. Each cluster is 
operated by a single private company, 
or companies. It appears for the most 
part cluster operators will outsource 
raw cotton production to farmers. 
President Mirziyoyev anticipates 
that the cotton sector will be fully 
privatized by 2022.7 Although regional 
governments (hokimiyats) remain 
important actors in the new system.
5 Gill, A. (2019) They said we wouldn’t have to pick and now they send us to the fields: Forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton harvest 2018, Uzbek-German Forum 
for Human Rights, April, available online: http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Cotton_Harvest_2018_Klein_Mail.pdf (8 October 2019); 
International Labour Organization (2019) Third party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2018 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, April, available 
online: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_681372.pdf  (accessed 8 October 2019)
6 ‘Shavkat Mirziyoyev: There are still 3.5 months before the end of the year, we should determine plans for next year today’, Website of the President of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan, 12 September 2018, available online: https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/2024 (accessed 1 January 2020) ; ‘Cluster system: Development prospects’, 
Committee on Agriculture and Water Management, Oliy Majlis, 2 May 2019, available online: http://parliament.gov.uz/ru/events/committee/25863/ (accessed 1 
January 2020); International Labour Organization (2019) Third party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2018 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, 1 
April, available online: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_681372.pdf (accessed 27 December 2019)
7 Syundyukova, N. (2018) ‘Uzbek President: The state will no longer deal with cotton’, The Qazaq Times, 3 December, available online: https://qazaqtimes.com/
en/article/52668 (accessed 8 October 2019); On Approval of a Strategy for the Development of Agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2020-2030, Decree, 
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.UP-5853, 23 October 2019, available online: https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4567337 (accessed 2 January 2020)
TO PICK THE VAST QUANTITIES OF 
COTTON, MILLIONS OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN 
FORCED BY THE STATE TO LABOUR IN 
UNSANITARY AND UNSAFE CONDITIONS.3
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The reform has already won 
notable praise from international 
commentators. The Economist, for 
example, led with the following 
headline in 2019, ‘for the sake of 
workers, Uzbekistan is privatising its 
cotton industry’.8 The International 
Labour Organization has also lent 
its qualified support, arguing that 
the cluster system will potentially 
help to increase productivity and 
remove the drivers of forced labour, 
if transparently governed with 
responsible investors and supportive 
tenure arrangements for farmers.9  
In order to accelerate the cluster 
system’s growth, the government 
of Uzbekistan has supplied finance, 
public assets, and tax relief to cluster 
operators. During 2017/18, 63 clusters 
were formally created through a 
number of government decrees, 
covering 501,614 hectares of land. 
The rapid pace of privatisation has 
the lure of greater value retention in 
Uzbekistan, and improved commercial 
conditions for farmers and labour. 
However, it is not without risks. The 
International Labour Organization 
underlines that the cluster system’s 
promise depends on the selection of 
‘responsible agricultural investors’.10 
This is a significant challenge in 
Uzbekistan, where white-collar crime, 
such as fraud, market manipulation, 
and corruption, remain enduring 
problems in the upper stratums of 
the private sector. 
While the Mirziyoyev government has 
committed to significant anti-corruption 
reforms, serious gaps remain particularly 
in the areas of corporate governance 
and market integrity. The laws which 
have been passed, primarily in the area 
of public integrity, are limited in effect 
by a lack of administrative capacity and 
political will. 
8 ‘For the sake of workers, Uzbekistan is privatising its cotton industry’, The Economist, 17 October 2019, available online: https://www.economist.com/
asia/2019/10/17/for-the-sake-of-workers-uzbekistan-is-privatising-its-cotton-industry (accessed 18 October 2019)
9 International Labour Organization (2019) Third party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2018 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, 1 April,  
available online: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_681372.pdf  (accessed 8 October 2019)
10 International Labour Organization (2019) Third party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2018 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, 1 April, p.87, 
available online: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_681372.pdf  (accessed 27 December 2019)
Table 1: Cluster creation by official decree during 2017/18
Govt of Uzbekistan Decree Clusters Created Hectares
On Measures to Create a Modern Cotton-Growing and Textile Cluster in the 
Syrdarya Region, 15 September 2017
2 18,000
On Measures to Introduce Modern Forms of Organizing Cotton-Textile 
Production, 25 January 2018
13 140,901
On Measures to Create Modern Cotton-Textile Production by Indorama 
Company (Singapore) in the Republic of Uzbekistan, 8 August 2018.
4 40,000
On Measures to Create a Modern Agricultural Cluster in Jizzakh Region,  
11 September 2018
1 2,000
On Additional Measures for the Further Development of Cotton and Textile 
Industries, 19 September 2018
43 300,713
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Given that the cotton sector has a 
history of systematic human rights 
abuses, and corruption, rapid 
privatisation in a climate marked by 
regulatory weakness poses acute risks, 
especially given broader challenges  
the government faces in attracting 
credible investors.11 These risks include:
 The outsourcing of human rights 
violations to the private sector.
 Abuse by cluster operators of weaker 
parties in the cotton value chain, 
including smallholder farmers and 
labourers.
 The improper provision of aid, 
preferential treatment and market 
advantage to cluster operators 
that have ties/influence with public 
officials; and
 Misuse of the cluster system by 
private operators to facilitate fraud, 
misappropriation, money-laundering 
and other illicit activities. 
 A failure to meet minimal integrity 
standards required for full 
reintegration into international 
textile and garment supply chains.
While important research is being 
conducted on the cluster system’s 
economic potential, and its labour track 
record to date, assessing the corporate 
integrity of those private actors 
charged with administering clusters 
remains an urgent outstanding task. 
Determining corporate integrity 
is complicated by the challenging 
informational context in Uzbekistan. 
There is little guidance to be had on 
effective methods for verifying the 
credentials of corporate operators,  
or the data-points through which  
such checks can be carried out.
11 On Approval of the Investment Policy Strategy of the Republic of Uzbekistan until 2025, draft Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.3394,  
10 May 2019, available online: https://regulation.gov.uz/ru/document/3394 (accessed 2 January 2020)
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This analysis is underpinned by a 
working hypothesis that open and 
transparent corporate entities, with 
appropriate policies, expertise, and 
assets, who are prepared to account for 
their activities publicly, are at a lower 
risk of engaging in improper conduct, 
as compared to companies that are 
opaque, and which exhibit warning 
signs such as personnel or investors 
implicated in illicit practices.  
In the initial phase of this research 
all clusters formalised through 
government decree between 15/9/2017 
and 18/3/2019 (71 in total), were 
scrutinised on the basis of transparency, 
corporate governance and professional 
track record. This was an experimental 
process, looking at what data could 
be obtained to verify integrity in 
Uzbekistan’s business environment 
(and in certain offshore locations 
used by cluster operators). Different 
methods were employed to obtain 
meaningful information under the 
aforementioned four core headings. 
12 Asian Development Bank Office of Anti-Corruption and Integrity (2015) Integrity principles and guidelines, available online: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/
files/institutional-document/32131/integrity-principles-guidelines.pdf (accessed 2 March 2020); European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Client 
due diligence’, no date, available online: https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/client-due-diligence.html (accessed 2 March 2020); Financial Action Task Force 
(2019) International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism & proliferation, available online: www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf (accessed 2 March 2020); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(2016) Guidelines on preventing and combating fraud and corruption in projects financed by IBRD loans and IDA credits and grants, available online: https://policies.
worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/40394039anti-corruption%20guidelines%20(as%20revised%20as%20of%20july%201,%202016).pdf (accessed 2 
March 2020); International Finance Corporation (2016) Update on tax issues and the policy on the use of offshore financial centres in World Bank Group private 
sector operations, available online: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8b51badf-48e8-4052-918c-5639850717d4/Summary-Updated-Report-on-OFC-
Implementation-July-2016.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=ltHVgO- (accessed 2 March 2020); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2015) G20/
OECD Principles of corporate governance, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en (accessed 2 March 2020); Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2018), OECD due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct, available online: https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-
Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf (accessed 2 March 2020); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009) OECD 
principles for integrity in public procurement, available online: https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994520.pdf (accessed 2 March 2020); United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (2013) Guidebook on anti-corruption in public procurement and the management of public finances, available online: https://www.unodc.org/
documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_anti-corruption_in_public_procurement_and_the_management_of_public_finances.pdf (accessed 2 
March 2020); World Bank (2010) Fraud and corruption awareness handbook, available online: siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/INT_inside_fraud_
text_090909.pdf (accessed 2 March 2020).
This study draws on a suite of investigative methods and data-
modelling techniques, which have been adapted to meet the 
challenging informational context in Uzbekistan. Using these 
methods an integrity-analysis of the cluster system’s corporate 
operators was conducted, looking at indicators associated with 
transparency, good governance, corporate social responsibility, 
and professional track-record. These indicators were drawn 
from benchmarks set out in manuals and guidance issued by 
the ADB, EBRD, IFC, OECD, UNODC and World Bank.12 
METHODOLOGY
PART I.II
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Table 2: Pilot Corporate Integrity Scorecard
Green Flag: Fully Transparent with 
Demonstrated Responsible Business 
Conduct
Amber Flag: No Public Information 
Available
Red Flag: Actively Non-Transparent 
with Record of Violating Responsible 
Business Conduct Benchmarks
Beneficial owners and persons with 
significant control declared 
Beneficial owners not publicly 
disclosed
Use of opaque legal structures
Financially transparent with credible 
financial information  
Shareholders not publicly disclosed Nominee shareholders, directors or 
head office
Public information available on senior 
managers and directors 
Identity of senior management team 
not disclosed
Use of secrecy jurisdiction
Public information available on 
corporate policies 
No substantive public information 
available on the track record, skills or 
experience of senior management team 
Provision of false or misleading 
financial/corporate information
Corporate social responsibility policy  
in place and publicly available
No public information on corporate 
policies 
Current/past legal or regulatory 
violations by beneficial owners
Annual reports publicly available No public information on corporate 
track record
Current/past legal or regulatory 
violations by managers
Responds to public requests for 
information
No publicly available annual reports Non-human rights-compliant or illegal 
business practices
Owners, managers, affiliated entities 
and company have credible track record 
in relevant sector
No publicly available financial 
information
Ties to politically exposed persons
Company secured public contracts, 
assets and other opportunities  
via competitive, transparent and  
open process
No response to request for information Secured public contracts, assets, and 
other opportunities, without public 
tender, or cognate process
Information was extracted from 
corporate registries, stock exchange 
filings, and legal databases, available 
in Uzbekistan, Russia, Switzerland, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the United 
Kingdom. This data was modelled and 
cross referenced with supplementary 
information drawn from corporate, 
government, and media websites.  
A formal freedom of information request 
was submitted to the Government of 
Uzbekistan, while 19 Russian language 
requests for basic corporate information 
were submitted to cluster operators. 
No reply was received to any of 
these requests.  
As this process took place iteratively, 
a systematic set of analytical criteria 
emerged benchmarked against 
international standards for corporate 
governance (see footnote 12), which 
provided a consistent platform for 
measuring corporate integrity. 
This iterative process gave rise to the 
‘corporate integrity scorecard’. The 
corporate integrity scorecard is both 
an investigative and analytical tool. 
It contains indicia of good and bad 
practice with respect to transparency, 
corporate governance and professional 
track record. Green flags are awarded 
where a corporate actor exhibits traits 
associated with good practice, amber 
flags are awarded where there is an 
absence of key data, while red flags are 
attributed when evidence is identified 
of bad practice. Accordingly, in this 
report red flags denote organisational 
features, professional practices, 
and transactions, that are credibly 
associated with  improper, illegal or 
criminal conduct. Red flags do not 
necessarily infer improper, illegal 
or criminal activity has taken place. 
However, they do ordinarily form 
a legitimate basis for heightened 
scrutiny by regulatory authorities, 
and their delegates (such as financial 
institutions). Their existence would also 
normally be a deterrent for responsible 
market actors, such as companies 
committed to responsible sourcing. 
The benchmarked criteria included in 
the scorecard acts as an investigative 
prompt on the one hand, while on the 
other it offers a broader analytical 
snapshot of sectoral risk with respect 
to abusive practices. 
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Some caution must be exercised. This 
assessment of integrity and risk is 
an approximation based off a pilot 
method which requires the application 
of professional judgement using 
evidence and internationally recognised 
benchmarks. This analytical process 
takes place in an opaque market 
context where there are significant 
challenges in accessing even basic 
information. Therefore, it is not an 
assessment that can be conducted with 
clinical accuracy. The aim rather is to 
produce a reasonable approximation 
based off a transparent criteria, robust 
data, and evidenced based analytical 
decisions, with scope for refining the 
integrity scorecard in future iterations.
Following the first round of investigative 
examinations covering all clusters 
formally established under decrees 
passed during 2017-19, a smaller 
sample of 20 clusters was intensively 
evaluated in the final three months 
of 2019.13 This provided an opportunity 
to systematically apply the integrity 
scorecard to assess risk in the cotton 
cluster system.   
Based off initial due diligence conducted 
earlier in 2019, of the 20 selected 
clusters, seven had been labelled 
green, six amber, and seven red, based 
on their integrity profile. Once this 
more systematic tool was applied, with 
established methods for identifying 
data-points, the cumulate distribution 
of flags shifted towards amber and 
red. This was primarily a result of 
information on the public record, which 
may have initially earned a cluster a 
green flag, leading to a line of inquiry 
that uncovered serious evidence of bad 
practice. It also signals the more robust 
criteria for transparency incorporated 
into the scorecard, which some clusters 
were not able to meet. 
At a quantitative level the key findings 
from the scorecard’s application 
include:
 The cluster sample population 
exhibited 15 green flags, 75 amber 
flags and 63 red flags. 
 The significant number of amber 
flags (49% of the total flags awarded) 
indicates that the cotton cluster 
system is marked by a fundamental 
lack of transparency, and an absence 
of evidence on the public record of 
good governance and professionalism. 
 The significant number of red flags 
(41% of the total flags awarded) 
suggests that a serious segment 
of the cotton cluster system is 
operated by private entities where 
there is an elevated risk of improper 
conduct.
 The green flags were almost 
entirely earned by one cluster 
operator, Indorama Kokand Textile, 
for transparency and corporate 
governance.14
During the evaluation two large 
business groupings were selected for 
case study research. They appeared 
to have responsibility for the largest 
number of clusters, 5 and 6 respectively. 
The case studies were populated 
with data drawn from company 
filings, government records, leaked 
documents, court judgements, and 
select secondary sources. Controlling 
minds behind these business groupings 
were also given an opportunity 
to respond.
These two groupings exhibited a 
significant number of red flags, based 
off an initial application of the corporate 
integrity scorecard. For example, 
secrecy jurisdictions had been employed 
in which to establish opaque legal 
structures populated by nominee 
office holders, while corporate filings 
on occasions appeared to contain 
misleading/false financial information. 
Further inquiries uncovered evidence 
that linked these business groupings 
to serious improper conduct, which 
impinged upon the clusters they operate 
in a variety of ways. The case studies, 
therefore, provide demonstrable 
evidence of the potential conduct at 
play when clusters exhibit a significant 
number of red flags.15
The following report presents findings 
from the two in-depth case studies, 
and the wider analysis conducted of the 
cluster system in Uzbekistan using the 
integrity scorecard. To begin, part two 
sets out the governance framework 
and pilot clusters that helped to 
establish the cotton cluster system 
during 2017. Parts three and four detail 
the in-depth case studies. Part five 
catalogues a selection of clusters that 
exhibited a high number of red flags. 
The report’s conclusion will consider 
recommendations that can help to 
strengthen corporate integrity in the 
cluster system.
13 This analysis covered Ellikala, Kurgantepa, Romitan, Kuychirchik, Pakhator, Karshi, Nishan, Sardoba, Oqoltin, Navbahor, Konimex, Uchkurgan, Shovot, Oqdaryo, 
Mirzaabad, Khovos, Chinaz, Rishton, Toshlok, and Kushtepa districts.
14 Though the integrity of Indorama Kokand Textile’s professional track record in Uzbekistan is a strongly contested matter. It has been the subject of serious 
allegations that its Uzbekistani textile operations sourced cotton produced through forced labour. See, Human Rights Watch, ‘Uzbekistan: Forced labour linked 
to World Bank corporate loan’, 6 July 2016, available online: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/06/uzbekistan-forced-labor-linked-world-bank-corporate-
loan (accessed 10 January 2020)
15 It is anticipated that the data produced through application of the integrity scorecard will in future iterations be cross-matched with data produced by cotton 
sector monitors, in order to determine whether high risk clusters from a corporate risk perspective are more likely to commit labour and other commercial 
infractions.
Out of the Cauldron, into the Fire? 15
II
A PILOT CLUSTER WITH SIGNIFICANT  
RED FLAGS
In 2017 the Mirziyoyev government announced it would 
pilot a new cotton cluster system. The pilot Bek cluster, 
as it became known, was formally established on 
15 September 2017 by Presidential decree, and located 
in the Syrdarya region.16 The pilot’s design, and the 
companies awarded the right to operate Bek cluster, 
foreshadow some of the risks and vulnerabilities that 
would manifest on a wider scale as the cotton cluster 
system rapidly expanded during 2018 and 2019.
PART II 
ORIGINS OF THE COTTON CLUSTER SYSTEM
16 On Measures to Create a Modern Cotton-Growing and Textile Cluster in the Syrdarya Region, Decree, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.PP-3279, 15 
September 2017, available online: http://lex.uz/docs/3352681 (accessed 8 October 2019)
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Under article two of the Presidential 
decree, 18,000 hectares of irrigated 
land is granted to Bek cluster. The 
decree does not explicitly state 
whether an access fee or annual rent 
will be charged. Article four of the 
decree grants the cluster operator 
custom payment exemptions up until  
1 January 2022, while article 11 requires 
the state-controlled Asaka Bank, and 
other commercial banks, to provide the 
cluster with ‘concessional credit lines’. 
The total investment earmarked for  
the pilot cluster is estimated at  
US$165 million based on projections  
in annex 2 of the decree.
The Presidential decree affords the 
cluster operator greater commercial 
freedom than has historically been 
extended to farmers. Article nine 
allows the pilot cluster to freely dispose 
of cotton products and determine price 
policy. The decree also touches on 
the sensitive area of labour relations. 
Article 10 states that the cluster operator 
is ‘to carry out settlements with farm 
workers on the land allotted to him 
on the basis of labor contracts on the 
principle of fair pay for labor and social 
support’. No additional guidance is 
provided on this principal, or how  
fair pay should be calculated.
Article one of the Presidential decree 
states that the companies selected 
to operate the pilot cluster were 
chosen on the basis of a proposal 
made by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Water Resources, the Ministry 
of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Council of Farmers of Uzbekistan, 
the Hokimiyat of the Syrdarya region, 
HC Uzpakhtasanoatexport, JSC 
Uzbekengilsanoat, local firm Mirzaobod 
Universal Trade Cluster LLC, Trontex LP 
and Gratum Trading LP. There is no 
reference to a public tender, or 
competitive evaluation. No additional 
evidence could be located on the public 
record which would suggest a tender 
took place, or that selection was 
governed through an alternative open 
and transparent process. This could 
conflict with Uzbekistan’s law  
On Anti-Corruption which requires  
open and transparent competition.17 
A freedom of information request for 
the proposal cited above was lodged 
in the required legal form with the 
Ministry of Agriculture. It was not 
responded to. A subsequent complaint 
submitted to the President’s Office 
failed to prompt a response either. This 
is a breach of the government’s legal 
obligations set out in Article 19 of the 
law, On the Openness of the Activities of 
Public Authorities and Administration.18 
Under the law authorities must respond 
within 15 working days after registering 
a request for information.
Two foreign companies are selected in 
the decree to partner with local firm, 
Mirzaobod Universal Trade Cluster LLC, 
in the cluster’s operation. They are 
Trontex LP and Gratum Trading LP. 
Both are Scottish Limited Partnerships. 
Domestic media headlines in Uzbekistan 
suggested: ‘The British will build a 
modern agricultural cluster in 
Uzbekistan’.19 
Up until 2007 Scottish Limited 
Partnerships (SLP) were an obscure 
and rarely used legal form. After 2007 
SLPs rapidly proliferated.20 In part, this 
spike in demand has been linked by UK 
criminal authorities and independent 
investigators, to certain legal features 
of the SLP that have proven attractive 
to money launderers and white collar 
criminals (although it is important to 
underline not all SLPs are used for 
improper or illegal purposes).21
17 On Anti-Corruption, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.ZRU-419, 3 January 2017, available online: www.lex.uz/ru/docs/3088013 (accessed 11 October 2019)
18 On the Openness of the Activities of Public Authorities and Administration, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.ZRU-369, 5 May 2014, available online:  
lex.uz/docs/2381138 (accessed 8 October 2019)
19 ‘The British will build a modern agricultural cluster in Uzbekistan’, Podrobno, 18 September 2017, available online: https://podrobno.uz/cat/economic/
britantsy-postroyat-v-uzbekistane-sovremennyy-agroklaster-/ (accessed 14 September 2019)
20 Bellingcat Investigation Team (2019) Smash & grab: The UK's money laundering machine, Bellingcat, 1 October, available online: https://www.bellingcat.com/
news/uk-and-europe/2019/10/01/smash-and-grab-the-uks-money-laundering-machine/ (accessed 8 October 2019); Department of Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy (2018) ‘Crackdown on abuse of UK businesses for foreign money laundering’, press release, 29 April, available online: https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/crackdown-on-abuse-of-uk-businesses-for-foreign-money-laundering (accessed 8 October 2019)
21 Cartin, G. (2017) Offshore in the UK: Analysing the use of Scottish Limited Partnerships, Transparency International and Bellingcat, June, available online: 
https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/offshore-in-the-uk/ (accessed 8 October 2019)
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Historically virtually no public reporting 
requirements have been placed on 
SLPs, allowing them to operate with 
complete financial and organisational 
secrecy. SLPs enjoy a UK address and 
the market confidence that goes along 
with that but unlike its English, Welsh 
and Northern Ireland equivalents, 
Scottish Limited Partnerships can enter 
into contracts and own property.22 They 
are also tax neutral. Together these 
factors have made SLPs an attractive 
vehicle for white-collar crime. In a 2017 
national risk assessment of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, 
HM Treasury and the UK Home Office 
confirm: ‘They are particularly attractive 
to criminals due to the fact that under 
Scottish law the partnership is a distinct 
legal personality, separate from the 
partners and is subject to fewer 
reporting and transparency obligations 
than most other corporate forms’.23
Following legal reforms, from 26 June 
2017, SLPs are required to declare 
persons with significant control (PSC).24 
However, the UK’s corporate registrar 
has no mandate or capacity to verify 
PSC declarations made by SLPs. The 
system, in effect, relies on entities to 
make truthful declarations.
It cannot be inferred from the above 
analysis that Trontex LP and Gratum 
Trading LP were set up to facilitate 
improper activity through the pilot Bek 
cluster. However, the use of this entity 
type given its opaque features and 
legal rights, constitutes a red flag 
from a risk perspective.
Both Trontex LP and Gratum Trading LP 
were established by the Edinburgh 
based Global Advisors in September 
2015 and September 2016 respectively.25 
Trontex LP’s principal place of business 
is 1st Floor Office, 86A Constitution 
Street, Edinburgh. Gratum Trading LP’s 
registered office address is Office 8,  
44-46 Morningside Road, Edinburgh. 
This is the same registered office 
address used by Esperansa Group LP.26 
Research from 2019 documented 
Esperansa Group LP’s 68.19% interest 
in Akfa Dream World.27 The latter 
company is part of the Akfa group, 
which was founded by the current 
Mayor of Tashkent, Jahongir Artikhodjaev. 
Akfa Dream World is one of the 
main investors in the controversial 
US$1.3 billion Tashkent City property 
development, which the Mayor is 
charged with overseeing.28 It is not clear 
whether Gratum Trading LP has any 
affiliation with the Akfa group beyond  
a shared registered office address.
22 Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (2018) Limited partnerships: Reform of limited partnership law, 30 April, pp.11 & 14, available online: 
data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2018-0413/limited-partnerships-review-of-limited-partnership-law.pdf (accessed 8 October 2019)
23 HM Treasury and Home Office (2017) National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2017, October, p.62, available online: https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_
and_terrorist_financing_2017_pdf_web.pdf (accessed 8 October 2019); see also Cartin, G. (2017) Offshore in the UK: Analysing the use of Scottish Limited 
Partnerships, Transparency International and Bellingcat, June, available online: https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/offshore-in-the-uk/ 
(accessed 8 October 2019)
24 Scottish Partnerships (Register of People with Significant Control) Regulations 2017
25 Gratum Trading LP, Application for Registration of a Limited Partnership, 20 September 2016, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/
SL028316/filing-history (accessed 8 October 2019); Trontex LP, Application for Registration of a Limited Partnership, 16 September 2015, available online: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL022512/filing-history (accessed 8 October 2019)
26 Esperansa Group LP, Change of Address LP6, 24 October 2017, available online: beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL025982/filing-history (accessed 8 
October 2019)
27 Akfa Dream World LLC, Company Extract, Reg No 557636, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 14 September 2019.
28 See http://tcibc.uz/about.html?tab=investors (accessed 8 October 2019)
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Gratum Trading LP and Trontex LP share 
the same General Partner and Limited 
Partner, Greencircle Services Ltd and 
Lemford Business Solutions Ltd. These 
are nominee partners registered in the 
Central American country of Belize. 
They are associated with a range of 
partnerships registered in Scotland. It 
was noted above that under UK reforms 
SLPs must now declare PSCs. It is 
permissible to declare another legal 
entity as PSC, providing it is one which 
also is required under law to declare 
its PSCs or is subject to analogous 
transparency requirements.29 
On the 6 November 2018, Gratum 
Trading LP and Trontex LP declared 
Galore Trade LP and Intrus Alliance LP 
respectively as their PSCs. They are 
Irish Limited Partnerships with a shared 
registered address in Cork.30 Both LPs 
were established on 14 June 2018.31  
Irish Limited Partnerships are not 
required to publicly register beneficial 
owners, or persons with significant 
control.32 Under the Scottish Partnerships 
(Register of People with Significant 
Control) Regulations 2017, it would 
appear unlawful to declare such an 
entity as PSC. 
After the 2017 pilot decree appointing 
Gratum Trading LP and Trontex LP as 
the Bek cluster operators, neither SLP 
has been subsequently cited in cotton 
cluster decrees. Gratum Trading LP was 
dissolved on 30 September 2019, 
Trontex LP was dissolved on 29 November 
2019. Mirzaobod Universal Trade Cluster 
is now the only company noted as 
operating Bek cluster. 
Mirzaobod Universal Trade Cluster 
is owned by Ulugbek Sotiboldiev 
(87.44%) and Bek Metal Production 
MCHJ (12.56%).33 Sotiboldiev is a senior 
operative within the ruling Uzbekistan 
Liberal Democratic Party. In 2018 he 
was listed as Chairman of the party’s 
Syrdarya Regional Council.34 More 
recently Sotiboldiev has been elected 
to the Senate of the Oliy Majlis and is 
a member of the Senate Budget and 
Economic Reform Committee.35 From a 
risk assessment perspective he would, 
accordingly, be regarded as a politically 
exposed persons.36 
Given that an opaque process was used 
to select the Bek cluster operators, 
which included a local company 
majority owned by a senior operative 
from the ruling political party, and 
two SLPs that have circumvented UK 
transparency reforms, which together 
were fronting a  US$165 million 
investment, this as a whole constitutes 
a series of serious red flags from a 
risk perspective. The type of red flags 
witnessed with the Bek pilot cluster 
would be observed on a wider scale as 
the cluster system expanded 
during 2018. 
29 The Scottish Partnerships (Register of People with Significant Control) Regulations 2017, 1(3); Financial Action Task Force (2018) Anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, available online: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf (accessed 18 October 2019)
30 See Gratum Trading LP, Persons with Significant Control, 6 November 2018, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL028316/
persons-with-significant-control (accessed 10 October 2019); Tronex LP, Persons with Significant Control, 6 November 2018, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL022512/persons-with-significant-control (accessed 11 November 2019).
31 List Of Limited Partnerships, Companies Registration Office, December 2019, available online: https://www.cro.ie/Portals/0/Publications/A%20list%20
of%20the%20LPs/Limited%20Partnerships%20Alphabetical%20order.pdf (accessed 2 February 2020)
32 See Limited Partnerships Act, 1907
33 Mirzaobod Universal Trade Cluster LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.4367, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 6 December 2019.
34 ‘Chairman of the Syrdarya Regional Council of UzLiDeP, Senator Ulugbek Sotiboldiev held an open dialogue with Syrdarya students’, Liberal Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan, 27 November 2018, available online: https://uzlidep.uz/ru/news-of-party/3519 (accessed 2 February 2019)
35 ‘The head of the company, which the president set as an example, was elected to the Senate’, Spot, 8 September 2018, available online: https://www.spot.uz/
ru/2018/09/08/bek-klaster/ (accessed 2 February 2020); ‘Ulugbek Sotiboldiev: Very high custom duties in Uzbekistan', Kun.uz, 13 July 2019, available online: 
https://kun.uz/ru/news/2019/07/13/ulugbek-sotiboldiyev-v-uzbekistane-tamojyennyye-poshliny-ochen-vysokiye   (accessed 2 February 2020)
36 Financial Action Task Force (2013) Politically Exposed Persons, Financial Action Task Force, June, available online: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/Guidance-PEP-Rec12-22.pdf  (accessed 2 February 2020)
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Diagram 2: Bek cluster joint venture partners and their affiliations (2017-2019)
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The formal expansion of the cotton cluster system during 
2018 was initiated through a Cabinet of Ministers decree dated 
25 January 2018.37 The decree extends the cluster system 
to encompass 13 more regions with 17 associated cluster 




37 On Measures to Introduce Modern Forms of Organizing Cotton-Textile Production, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 25 January 2018, available 
online: www.lex.uz/ru/docs/3527483 (accessed 11 October 2019)
38 On the Openness of the Activities of Public Authorities and Administration, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.ZRU-369, 5 May 2014, available online: www.
lex.uz/docs/2381138 (accessed 8 October 2019)
Like with the pilot cluster, it appears 
that the companies appointed to 
operate these new clusters were 
not selected through a transparent, 
competitive process. Instead, the 
governing decree states that cluster 
operators were chosen on the basis of 
a proposal made by each company in 
conjunction with the relevant regional 
government. A freedom of information 
request for a copy of these proposals, 
made in the legally required format, 
was not responded to by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, or the President’s Office. 
It was noted in the previous section 
that this is a breach of their legal 
obligations under article 19 of the law 
On the Openness of the Activities of 
Public Authorities and Administration.38 
The 25 January 2018 decree also 
sets out the state aid which will be 
provided to the cotton clusters. Article 
four declares that operators will be 
provided with loans from the State 
Support Fund for Agriculture under the 
Ministry of Finance. These loans will 
fund at least 60% of the costs required 
for the cultivation and supply of raw 
cotton, at a capped interest rate of 3%. 
Additionally, provisions are made for 
the extension of preferential credit 
lines to help co-finance proposals 
put forward by cluster operators. 
PART II.II
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Exemptions are also provided for. 
Cluster organisers are given custom 
duty exemptions under article 13 up 
until 1 January 2020. Where cluster 
organisers are directly involved in raw 
cotton production, it is unclear whether 
they will be allocated land on a zero cost 
basis, or on the basis of a commercial 
arrangement with annual rent. 
An additional Cabinet of Ministers 
decree passed on 31 March 2018, orders 
the sale of building and structures 
of ginneries and cotton-harvesting 
centres to cluster operators. The 
conditions governing these sales to 
ensure value for money, transparency, 
and probity, are not specified in 
the decree.39
Returning back to the 25 January 2018 
decree, it enumerates a number of 
governance mechanisms for the new 
cluster system. It is envisaged in the 
decree that each cluster will, to an 
extent, subcontract the production of 
raw cotton out to farmers. To help 
facilitate subcontracting arrangements, 
article three stipulates that the 
government will produce a standard 
contract. The Prosecutor General’s 
Office is responsible for overseeing 
compliance between the contracting 
parties (i.e. the cluster organiser and 
farmer). It is also assigned responsibility 
for ensuring ‘the efficient use of land 
in the framework of cotton and 
textile production’. 
A number of articles in the decree 
regulate the provision of inputs, 
price setting for raw cotton and the 
processing of raw cotton by ginneries, 
and the sale of by-products. A 
monitoring system is also provided 
for. Under article 11 Territorial 
Working Groups are established in 
order to monitor the organisation of 
cotton-textile production, and make 
recommendations for improvements. 
A copy of the standard contract, 
and the reports issued by Territorial 
Working Groups, were requested using 
right to information laws. However, as 
noted above, the government bodies 
concerned failed to comply with their 
legal requirement to respond.
On 19 September 2018 a Cabinet of 
Ministers resolution was passed 
expanding the cotton cluster system 
further. It introduced 44 more clusters, 
covering 300,713 hectares of land 
(subsequent amendments increased 
this to 58 clusters, covering 463,836 
hectares).40 Like with the January 
decree, the new cluster operators were 
chosen on the basis of submissions 
made by the companies in conjunction 
with the relevant regional government. 
It does not appear that this was an open 
or competitive process.
While the resolution replicates the 
governance framework set out in the 
earlier January decree, it contains a 
number of additional clauses worth 
noting. Most critically, it appears 
that farmers who fail to fulfull their 
contractual obligation to cluster 
organisers, face the loss of their 
land, the rights over which will be 
reallocated to the cluster organiser. It is 
also established that cluster operators 
must submit monthly analytical and 
tabular materials on their performance 
to government. 
Concern, in particular, has been raised 
over the compromised position of 
farmers under these arrangements 
established during 2018.41 Evidence 
that regional governments remain 
closely involved in cluster operations 
(see Part V), has compounded these 
concerns. The risk of abuse and 
potential impropriety incentivised by 
such governance arrangements, will be 
heightened if the organisational actors 
responsible for cluster operations are 
not open, transparent and responsible 
corporate citizens. As the opening 
of this report made clear, there is a 
worrying number of red flags in the 
sector. The following two sections 
document the problematic conduct 
which can lie behind business groupings 
that exhibit serious red flags.
39 On Additional Measures for the Organization of Cotton-Textile Productions and Clusters, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.253, 31 
March 2018, available online: https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/3607500  (accessed 11 October 2019)
40 On Additional Measures for the Further Development of Cotton and Textile Industries, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.744, 19 
September 2018, available online: https://www.lex.uz/docs/3906242 (accessed 2 February 2020) 
41 International Labour Organization (2019) Third party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2018 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, 1 April, available 
online: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_681372.pdf  (accessed 8 October 2019)
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42 ‘For the sake of workers, Uzbekistan is privatising its cotton industry’, The Economist, 17 October 2019, available online: https://www.economist.com/
asia/2019/10/17/for-the-sake-of-workers-uzbekistan-is-privatising-its-cotton-industry (accessed 18 October 2019)
III
The Uztex group has become one notable corporate face publicly fronting 
Uzbekistan’s cluster system experiment. The company was profiled by 
The Economist in a 2019 article on the Government of Uzbekistan’s cotton 
privatisation initiative.42 The magazine reports: ‘The firm (Uztex) is keen to show 
off how well it treats its workers: they earn seven times the minimum wage, 
with perks like free health care thrown in’. It continues: ‘On Uztex’s factory floor, 
a smiling seamstress holds up a t-shirt emblazoned with a slogan that seems 
to speak to the industry’s aspirations. “Ready to be different,” it reads’.
PART III 
IRREGULAR OFFSHORE DEALINGS:  
A LOOK INSIDE THE UZTEX GROUP
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Table 3: Uztex cotton clusters, September 201944

































Shovot Tekstil LLC $47,157,853 Intrade AG 
(89.18%)
Uztex’s significant role in the cotton 
cluster system is not surprising, 
given its size. In a 2017 company 
brochure Uztex group claims to be 
‘the largest manufacturer of textile 
goods in Uzbekistan. It consists of eight 
factories, where several thousand 
employees work’.43
This expansive operation is 
administered through a number of 
locally incorporated legal entities. 
They include, Uztex Uchkurgan LLC, 
Uchqurgan Textile LLC, Katqala-Teks LLC, 
Shovot Tekstil LLC, Uztex Shovot LLC, 
Eurotex Global LLC, Uztex Tashkent LLC, 
Uztex Group LLC, Textile Finance 
Namangan LLC, and Textile Finance 
Khorezm LLC. The italicised entities 
are responsible for clusters across 
five districts, as set out in table three. 
Uztex shareholders are primarily 
offshore entities incorporated in the UK, 
Singapore and Switzerland. 
43 Razetdinova, J. (2017) ‘Investment in workforce - is investment in the future of the company’, Uztex Magazine, No.1 Autumn, available online: https://www.
yumpu.com/en/document/read/59560256/eng-light-uztex- (accessed 30 December 2019)
44 Textile Finance Namangan LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.66, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019; Textile Finance 
Khorezm LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.118, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019; Uztex Uchkurgan LLC, Company Extract, 
Reg No.12230, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019; Uchqurgan Textile LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.25330, Unified 
Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019; Shovot Tekstil LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.335, Unified Portal of Interactive Public 
Services, accessed 28 September 2019.
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Uztex’s website features no information 
on the senior executive team, directors, 
or owners. However, press reports 
mention key individuals alleged to 
be involved with the group. The most 
notable reoccurring name is 43 year 
old Uzbekistani national, Farkhod 
Mamatdjanov. In a 2014 industry report, 
he is said to be the owner of the Uztex 
group.45 A similar claim was published 
in an Italian newspaper two years later 
during 2016.46 In a recent government 
announcement Mamatdjanov is listed 
as Uztex group Chairman.47 
A corporate brochure produced by 
Uztex in 2017 confirms the group 
is controlled by the Mamatdjanov 
family. It features an interview with 
Fakhritdin Mamatdjanov the family’s 
elder patriarch. Mamatdjanov Snr 
claims he and his son Farkhod began 
the business in the mid-1990s running a 
polypropylene bag production factory. 
Mamatdjanov Snr states this was when 
‘our way to Uztex Group began’.48
Radio Ozodlik also alleges that Farkhod 
Mamatdjanov (the son of Fakhritdin 
Mamatdjanov) is the shadow owner 
of Invest Finance Bank (InFinBank).49 
InFinBank is a joint stock company 
commercial bank established in 
Uzbekistan during 2007. It has been 
appointed by the government to service 
a number of cotton clusters allocated 
to the Uztex group. 
InFinBank made headlines during 2013 
when it was reported to be the banker 
for a large corporate group believed to 
be owned by President Islam Karimov’s 
eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova. 
Karimova headed an expansive 
organised crime operation that used 
the power of her father’s office to 
monopolise lucrative business and 
rent-seeking opportunities in 
Uzbekistan.50 A Radio Ozodlik source 
claims when Karimova came under 
investigation by Uzbekistani authorities, 
her media arm, the Terra Group, had 
‘more than a dozen accounts [with 
InfinBank] and the total turnover in 
them is so large that bank experts have 
not yet been able to prepare a report on 
the details for the investigator’.51 
In a boost to its public standing, during 
2017 InFinBank was selected by the 
Asian Development Bank to partner 
in its Trade Finance Program.52 
45 ‘The Uztex spinning plant becomes ECOrized’, Texdata International, 19 March 2014, available online: https://www.texdata.com/news/Spinning/7693.
The-UZTEX-Spinning-Plant-becomes-â€žECOrizedâ€œ.html  (accessed 30 December 2019)
46 ‘Lonati raddoppia il "colpo" in Uzbekistan’, Bresciaoggi, 5 February 2016, available online: https://www.bresciaoggi.it/home/economia/lonati-raddoppia-
il-colpo-in-uzbekistan-1.4623429 (accessed 7 October 2019)
47 ‘On rewarding in connection with the twenty-eighth anniversary of independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan a group of civil servants and workers 
in the industrial and socio-economic sectors’, Decree, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 30 August 2019, available online: uza.uz/ru/documents/o-
nagrazhdenii-v-svyazi-s-dvadtsativosmiletiem-nezavisimosti-30-08-2019 (accessed 10 February 2020)   
48 ‘Work as the essence of life - Interview with Mamatjanov Fakhritdin Djuraevich’, Uztex Magazine, No.1 Autumn 2017, available online: https://www.
yumpu.com/en/document/read/59560256/eng-light-uztex-  (accessed 30 December 2019)
49 Babadzhanov, S. (2018) ‘Half a billion dollars lawsuit filed against ex-Prosecutor General Kadyrov’, Radio Ozodlik, 6 March, available online: https://rus.
ozodlik.org/a/29080195.html (accessed 30 December 2019)
50 ‘United States sanctions human rights abusers and corrupt actors across the globe’, US Department of Treasury, 21 December 2017, available online: 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0243 (accessed 12 February 2020)
51 ‘Gulnara Karimova's Terra group bank accounts have been frozen’, Radio Ozodlik, 29 October 2013, available online: https://www.ozodlik.org/a/25151464.
html (accessed 28 December 2019)
52 ‘ADB, InFin Bank sign trade finance deal in Uzbekistan’, Asian Development Bank, 5 July 2017, available online: https://www.adb.org/news/adb-infin-
bank-sign-trade-finance-deal-uzbekistan (accessed 30 December 2019)
Looking to its ownership structure, 
InFinBank’s 2015 financial statements 
claim the institution is ‘ultimately 
controlled by Mr Mamadjanov Fakhritdin 
Djuraevich’, Farkhod’s father and 
Uztex group elder.53 Over the past four 
years Mamatdjanov Snr has retained a 
significant stake in InFinBank, alongside 
Swiss Capital International Group AG, 
and Alfa Group LLC, an Uzbekistani 
firm majority owned by English Limited 
Liability Partnership, Wayrex LLP 
(99.99%).54 Swiss Capital and Alfa 
Group have also been used to hold 
shares in the Uztex group. Historically 
a significant investment vehicle for 
InFinBank is Infinleasing. Its shares 
were held by Nargiza Mamatdjanova 
when the company extract was checked 
in December 2019.55 According to a 
source familiar with the Mamatdjanov 
family, she is the wife of Farkhod 
Mamatdjanov. 
It would appear there is credible body 
of evidence to support the contention 
that Uztex and InFinBank are part of the 
same conglomerate controlled by the 
Mamatdjanov family.
Table 4: Invest Finance Bank shareholders56


























































53 Invest Finance Bank (2015), Invest Finance Bank: Consolidated Financial Statements and Independent Auditor’s Report, 31 December, available online: https://
www.infinbank.com/upload/iblock/334/334a2e4b766c89287373061f77f09da6.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019)
54 Alfa Group, Company Extract, Reg No.777, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 14 February 2020.
55 Infinleasing, Company Extract, Reg No.17889, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 30 December 2019.
56 Abdullaev, Z.C. (2016), ‘Attraction of foreign investments to JCSB “InFinBank”’, 10 February, available online: https://www.infinbank.com/en/press/
news/2016/02/552/ (accessed 10 February 2020); Extraordinary general meeting of shareholders, InFinBank, 17 February 2017, available online: http://www.
infinbank.com/upload/iblock/82a/82ad7d67cd9aff689e92b48dfd7ce8fd.doc (accessed 10 February 2020); Extraordinary general meeting of shareholders, 
InFinBank, 14 February 2018, available online: https://www.infinbank.com/en/investors/decisions/2018/08/2085/ (accessed 10 February 2020); Ordinary 
general meeting of shareholders, InFinBank, 25 June 2019, available online: https://www.infinbank.com/en/investors/decisions/2019/06/2065/(accessed 10 
February 2020)
Careful examination of Uztex-InFinBank’s offshore 
shareholding structure reveals more about the ultimate 
ownership of these major brands, and the business methods 
they employ. 
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Table 5: Uztex linked offshore entities, accounts, UK59
Legal Entity Principal Business Profit Assets Notable People
Maritex Industrial LLP Trade agent for textile 
goods
£3,482 £22,357 Accounts signed by Ali Moulaye (2016, 2017) 
and Kang Dong-Hee (2018)
DF Industries LLP Trade agent for 
construction materials
£7,601 £49,704 Accounts signed by Ali Moulaye (2014, 2015, 
2016) and Dong-Hee Kang (2017)
Wayrex LLP Trade agent for 
polymeric raw materials
£22,802 £226,530 Accounts signed by Ali Moulaye (2015, 2016, 
2017) and Kang Dong-Hee (2018, 2019). 
Visitex Universal LP N/A N/A N/A
New Medical Edwards 
LLP
Trade of raw materials 
and equipment
£33 £597 Georgios Bountakidis, Manager.
57 Katqala-Teks LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.14257, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 1 October 2019; Eurotex Global LLC, Company Extract, 
Reg No.1518, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019.
58 Uztex Tashkent LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.26365, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 October 2019.
59 Maritex Industrial LLP, Report of the Members for the Financial Period from 01.02.2018 to 31.01.2019, Companies House, 17 June 2019, available online: https://
beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC397544/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020); DF Industries LLP, Report of the Members for the Financial 
Period from 01.09.2017 to 31.08.2018, Companies House, 9 January 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC387355/filing-
history (24 February 2020); Wayrex LLP, Report of the Members for the Financial Period from 01.03.2018 to 28.02.2019, Companies House, available online: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC311533/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020); New Medical Edwards LLP, Financial Statement for the 
Year Ended 31/01/2019, Companies House, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC381453/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020)
As noted above, a significant volume of the shares held in  
Uztex entities, and InFinBank, are ultimately owned by a 
number of offshore entities based in the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland and Singapore. In addition to these offshore 
entities, Farkhod Mamatdjanov’s brother Doniyor has a minority 
stake in Katqala-Teks (10.03%) and Eurotex Global (13.44%).57 
His other brother Dilshod has a 7.34 stake in Uztex Tashkent.58
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The UK legal entities employed to hold 
shares in the group are primarily 
English Limited Liability Partnerships, 
and a Scottish Limited Partnership. 
Both legal forms have been 
characterised as high risk from an 
integrity perspective, owing to their 
opaque characteristics, which has 
made them an attractive node in 
money laundering schemes. It cannot 
be inferred from this that the LLPs or 
LP used by Uztex are involved in illicit 
activity. Nevertheless, they do exhibit 
a number of red flags. 
It is worth noting the significant number 
of accounts filed, which are signed by 
Ali Moulaye. Investigative journalists 
Oliver Bullough and Jane Bradley link 
Moulaye to a network of 127 companies 
implicated in ‘large-scale tax evasion, 
fraud, or corruption’.60 When Moulaye 
was located by the pair, in order to 
obtain comment on this network of 127 
companies, it was revealed he is now a 
suburban dentist in Brussels. Moulaye 
told the reporters ‘I have no clue what 
these companies are, where they are 
based, and what’s their business’.61 
An Estonian newspaper, Postimees, 
attempted to locate another Uztex 
linked manager, Georgios Bountakidis. 
This occurred after an entity he 
administered was implicated in the 
Russian ‘global laundromat’ exposé. 
They report: ‘When Postimees tried to 
get Bountakidis on the phone using the 
company’s contact information, 
we were told it is impossible to reach 
the Cypriot’.62 
Also, of note, is the modest assets, and 
low profits, declared by Uztex offshore 
entities in their UK corporate filings. 
This prima facie appears to stand in 
contrast to their shareholdings in major 
Uzbekistani industrial combines. 
An individual common to all UK entities 
listed above, is their stated person with 
significant control (PSC), Mr Jean-Claude 
Beaujean. Beaujean declares himself to 
be both a Belgium and French national. 
In most instances Beaujean’s PSC 
declaration is premised on his control 
over the companies, rather than 
ownership or right to surplus assets. 
Therefore, based on the UK registry 
data it is unclear who the beneficial 
owners are of these partnerships. 
Attempts to contact Beaujean through 
his registered UK address and social 
media accounts were unsuccessful.   
Less information is available on the 
Singapore based holding entities 
featured in the Uztex group structure. 
Singapore laws do not require PSC 
declarations. The records filed by Uztex 
holding entities feature what appear 
to be nominee directors, and nominee 
shareholders. 
60 Bradley, J. and Bullough, O. (2018) ‘The ghost companies connected to suspected money laundering, corruption, and Paul Manafort’, BuzzFeed, 23 August, 
available online: https://www.buzzfeed.com/janebradley/shell-companies-money-laundering-uk-paul-manafort (accessed 15 May 2019)
61 Bradley, J. and Bullough, O. (2018) ‘The ghost companies connected to suspected money laundering, corruption, and Paul Manafort’, BuzzFeed, 23 August, 
available online: https://www.buzzfeed.com/janebradley/shell-companies-money-laundering-uk-paul-manafort (accessed 15 May 2019) 
62 Vark, J. and Berendson, R. (2017) ‘Bitter moment of truth for Estonian banking’, Postimees, 22 March, available online: https://news.postimees.ee/4055253/
bitter-moment-of-truth-for-estonian-banking (accessed 30 September 2019)
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Table 7: Uztex linked offshore entities, Singapore64
Company Director/Secretary Shareholder
Eastex Systems Pte Ltd Ruth Ella Neidhart (Switzerland) 
Koh David (Singapore)
Fong Kok Liong Lawrence (Singapore)
Rajamohan Ramachandran (India)
Hightex Singapore Pte Ltd Koh David (Singapore) 
Daniella Dimitrova (Cyprus) 
Fong Kok Liong Lawrence (Singapore) 
Umrat Hayat (Pakistan)
63 Katqala-Teks LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.14257, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 1 October 2019; Textile Finance Namangan LLC, 
Company Extract, Reg No.66, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019; Uchqurgan Textile LLC, Company Extract, Reg 
No.25330, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019; Uztex Group LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.25, Unified Portal of 
Interactive Public Services, accessed 15 June 2019; Uztex Group LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.25, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 14 
February 2020; Uztex Shovot LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.46, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 15 June 2019. 
64 Eastex Systems Pte Ltd, Company Extract, Reg No. 201431886M, Singapore Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, accessed on 26 August 2019; 
Hightex Singapore Pte Ltd, Company Extract, Reg No.201540178E, Singapore Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, accessed on 26 August 2019.
Table 6: 2019 Uzbekistani interests of Uztex linked offshore entities, UK63 
Legal Entity Jean Claude Beaujean, Nature of Control Uzbekistani Subsidiaries
Maritex Industrial LLP Has significant influence or control Textile Finance Namangan (100%), 
Katqal’a Texs (73.44%),  
Eurotex Global (37.14%)
DF Industries LLP Has significant influence or control Uchkurgan Textile (83.01%)
Wayrex LLP Has significant influence or control Alfa Group (99.99%)
Visitex Universal LP Right to surplus assets - 75% or more 
Ownership of voting rights - 75% or more
Uztex Group (63.05%) 
[Note: During 2019 the offshore  
holding structure changed from  
Visitex Universal LP (63.05%) to  
Hightex Singapore Pte Ltd (48.72%)]
New Medical Edwards LLP Has significant influence or control Uztex Shovot (92.5%)
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We encounter the same challenges in 
Switzerland. Like Singapore, Switzerland 
does not have a PSC register. Companies 
incorporated in Switzerland as 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung65 
(GmbH) have a share register which is 
publicly available through the relevant 
commercial registry. They do not have 
to declare beneficial owners. Entities 
incorporated as Aktiengesellschaft66 
(AG), do not have to publicly declare 
their shareholders or beneficial owners. 
AGs are the most popular legal form  
in Switzerland. 
A better understanding of how the 
complex offshore structure behind 
Uztex-InFinBank operates, and some of 
the problematic practices it is tied to, 
can be appreciated through a deeper 
look at two critical spokes, Swiss 
Capital International Group AG, and 
Wayrex LLP. Once these two companies 
have been scrutinised, a close client 
of Uztex will be introduced, the Swiss 
multinational, Rieter. A series of leaked 
documents will then be examined which 
record highly irregular transactions 
between Uztex and Rieter that took 
place through this offshore structure. 
Table 8: Uztex linked offshore entities, Switzerland67
Company Board Members Shareholders






















65 Translated as company with limited liability.
66 Translated as company limited by shares. 
67 Swiss Capital International Group, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, available online: https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.
xhtml?uid=CHE-116.256.847 (accessed 10 December 2019);  Swiss Invest Holding AG, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, available online: https://
zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.xhtml?uid=CHE-341.618.848 (accessed 10 December 2019); Intrade AG, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, 
available online: https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.xhtml?uid=CHE-137.748.961 (accessed 10 December 2019) 
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Diagram 3: Uztex group offshore structure
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Diagram 4: Swiss Capital International Group AG, finance and investment structure
Swiss Capital International GroupWayrex LLP
Mr Jean Claude 
Beaujean

























THE SWISS CAPITAL 
INTERNATIONAL GROUP AG
Swiss Capital International Group AG (Swiss Capital) was 
incorporated on 26 November 2010. According to annual financial 
statements for 2015, obtained from the company’s website, its 
Uzbekistani holdings have included Aysel Invest (98.99%) the then 
owner of Radisson Blu Tashkent, Uztex Shovot, and Asia Trans 
Terminal.68  We also know from filings in Uzbekistan, that Swiss 
Capital has held significant stakes in Uztex firm Textile Finance 
Khorezm LLC, as well as InFinBank. 
68 Swiss Capital International Group (2016), Annual Audited Non-Consolidated Financial Statements for the Period from 01/01/2015-31/12/2015, available online: 
www.swisscapitalag.com/upload/2015.pdf (accessed 10 January 2020)
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Owing to the limited reporting 
requirements demanded of AGs in 
Switzerland, public information is only 
available on Swiss Capital’s board. 
The current board has two members, 
Thomas Huber and Aiaz Bakasov.69 
Farkhod Mamatdjanov is listed as a 
former member of the board, alongside 
Swiss national Peter Schafflützel. 
Leaked internal records provide further 
insight into the structure standing 
behind Swiss Capital’s limited public 
face. A copy of the company’s share 
register dated 7 March 2016 records 
that Swiss Capital’s shares are owned 
by Swiss Invest Holding AG.70 A copy 
of Swiss Invest Holding AG’s share 
register, which is undated, lists one 
shareholder, Peter Schafflützel, a  
Swiss national born 2 March 1952.71  
He acquired 200 shares in Swiss Invest 
Holding AG on 6 March 2015, and a 
further 1000 shares on 28 September 
2015. Internal Swiss Capital documents 
suggest that Schafflützel is an agent 
acting on behalf of a third party.
The first clue, in this respect, is a 
legal document dated 1 February 
2016.72 It gives Schafflützel power of 
attorney to purchase and maintain 
an apartment on behalf of Farkhod 
Mamatdjanov at the exclusive Hard 
Turm Park development in Zurich. 
Hard Turm Park’s street address is 
Pfingstweidstrasse 98, Zurich. This is 
the same address used by Swiss Capital 
since 2017. It appears the apartment 
was paid for during April 2016. On 28 
April, CHF3 million was transferred to 
Farkhod Mamatdjanov’s bank account 
with the Lichtenstein based VP Bank. 
The transfer description reads ‘Herr 
Alisher Razakov U/O, Herr Muzaffar 
Razakov’. Alisher and Muzaffar Razakov 
are business people tied to at the 
Swiss multinational, Rieter. Following 
this credit, CHF946,676 was then paid 
to Prospera AG, and CHF1,893,344 to 
Hardturm AG, the companies which  
own the Hardturm development.73
The authors also received copies of 
internal emails sent between then 
Swiss Capital President Peter Schafflützel, 
and a Swiss Capital manager, Said 
Tulyaganov. In the exchange Tulyaganov 
appears to be working on behalf of 
Farkhod Mamatdjanov. Tulyaganov is 
listed as Finance Director for the Uztex 
group in a 2017 company brochure.74
The first email, dated 13 June 2016, 
includes instructions sent to a Ms 
Devaux by Peter Schafflützel on 
behalf of Swiss Capital. It states,  
‘the matter was resolved upon 
my return from Uzbekistan. In the 
meantime you received information 
from Mr. F. Mamatdjanov / A. Razakov 
during your visits to Switzerland.  
Mr. Said Tulyaganov has sent you 
further documents (conclusion SCIG)’.75 
The email confirms that Swiss Capital 
wishes to proceed with a capital increase 
from CHF 1.2 million to CHF 16 million. 
This increase, the email chain discloses, 
will be facilitated through a US dollar 
loan from Wayrex LLP to Swiss Invest 
Holding AG, the company holding  
Swiss Capital shares. 
A ‘Payment Order’ dated 21 December 
2016 indicates loans from Wayrex LLP 
have been a key source of finance for 
Swiss Capital International Group AG. 
The payment order is in the amount of 
US$7,281,197.60, for the ‘return’ of loans 
associated with agreements dated 
28/08/2015 (US$700,000),  
29/12/2014 (US$1,441,197.91), 
15/12/2015 (US$1,800,000),  
15/10/2014 (US$3,060,193.75), 
10/04/2014 (US$145,952.69),  
20/7/2015 (US$19,474.20),  
27/12/2013 (US$28,692.59), and 
18/09/2015 (US$85,686.47).76 
69 Swiss Capital International Group, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, available online: https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.
xhtml?uid=CHE-116.256.847 (accessed 10 December 2019)  
70 Swiss Capital International Group AG, Share Register, Certified by Beat Hammig Deputy Public Notary, 7 March 2016.
71 Swiss Invest Holding AG, Share Register, no date.
72 Power of Attorney with Power of Substitution Agreement, between Farkhod Mamatdjanov and Peter Schafflützel, 1 February 2016.
73 Account Statement, Mamatdjanov Farkhod, 01/04/2016 - 31/12/2016, VP Bank.
74 Uztex Magazine, No.1 Autumn 2017, available online: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/59560256/eng-light-uztex-  (accessed 30 December 2019)
75 Email from Peter Schafflützel to Said Tulyaganov, 13 June 2016.
76 Payment Order 10 from Swiss Capital International Group, to Wayrex LLP, 21 December 2016.
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Diagram 5: The Mamatdjanov family, and key corporate affiliations
In an email to Tulyaganov, Swiss 
Capital’s President Peter Schafflützel 
explains ‘after SCIG share increase  
(pt. 13), main shareholder SIH  
(FM/Wayrex in background) will get  
the new share certificate with amount 
of CHF 16 Mio. for the investment’.77  
FM appears to be shorthand for Farkhod 
Mamatdjanov, who is referred to by his 
full name earlier in the email chain. 
In reply, Tulyaganov raises concerns 
over the procedure being used to 
facilitate this increase in capital:  
‘Dear Peter, F. not approved to make 
share increase of SIH. Why you indicated 
this in step 1? We don’t want to pay 1% 
tax from SIH. Please update your plan or 
agree new scheme with F’.78 F appears to 
be shorthand for Farkhod Mamatdjanov. 
Schafflützel confirms in an email to 
Said Tulyaganov, Farkhod Mamatdjanov 
and Alisher Razakov: ‘We discussed the 
matter several times in the past and  
I always have mentioned that there will 
be emission tax for SIH [Swiss Invest 
Holding] (capital contribution is also 
taxable) and SCIG and it was ok from 
your side. Also Mr. Rupf has informed 
FM/AR about this matter when they 
called him’.79 
A frustrated Tulyaganov relays his 
concerns over the exchange to Farkhod 
Mamatdjanov on the 20 June 2016. 
Documents filed with the Zurich 
commercial register indicate the capital 
increase went ahead, with Credit 
Suisse confirming deposited funds of 
US$15.655 million.80 According to the 
email exchange between Tulyaganov 
and Schafflützel, this deposit was to 
be provided by Wayrex LLP. The Swiss 
register filings, however, do not record 
the source of these funds. Wayrex 
LLP accounts signed by Ali Moulaye 
on 25 April 2017 indicate that Wayrex 
LLP had £27,413 in debtors, alongside 
£154,429 in cash.81 This does not appear 
to correlate with commercial activity 
recorded in Swiss Capital internal 
documentation.
77 Email from Peter Schafflützel to Said Tulyaganov, 17 June 2016. 
78 Email from Said Tulyaganov to Peter Schafflützel, 17 June 2016.
79 Email from Peter Schafflützel to Said Tulyaganov, 20 June 2016
80 Letter from Kerim El Eyadi Amacher, Assistant Vice President Credit Suisse, and Jurg Bissegger, Assistant Vice President Credit Suisse, to The Board of 
Directors, Swiss Capital International Group, 18 June 2016.
81 Wayrex LLP, Report of the Members for the Financial Period From 1.03.206 to 28.02.2017, 25 April 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
















































34 Out of the Cauldron, into the Fire?
82 See http://swisscapitalag.com/division/dairy-products-division (accessed 12 January 2020)
83 Stavropol Region Arbitration Court, Case No.A63 - 13475/2018, Decision, 19 December 2018.
84 Stavropol Regional Court Criminal, Case No.22-958/2019, Appeal Decision, 26 February 2019.
Further evidence on Swiss Capital’s 
operations and ownership structure 
has become public following a number 
of legal cases in Russia during 2018/19. 
Swiss Capital had acquired, prior to 
this period a number of Russian assets, 
including a 50% stake in Pyatigorsk 
Dairy Plant LLC. According to Swiss 
Capital’s website it ‘is one of the largest 
enterprises of the Stavropol Region on 
milk processing and the development 
of dairy products’.82 It appears that 
at some stage during 2016/17, the 
venture’s local partner, and the dairy 
plant’s General Director, were in 
conflict with Swiss Capital. 
This led to allegations by Swiss 
Capital and Farkhod Mamatdjanov 
that the dairy plant’s General 
Director, Konstantin Sukharev, had 
made defamatory remarks damaging 
their honour, dignity and business 
reputation.83 The Stavropol Region 
Arbitration Court rejected this claim. 
In the judgement it was revealed 
that Surkharev had sent letters to 
the Uzbekistani authorities raising 
concerns over Swiss Capital, and 
Farkhod Mamatdjanov, in addition to 
several other individuals connected 
to Swiss Capital. Surkharev’s letter, 
which was quoted in the judgement, 
alleges that Mamatdjanov uses a ‘chain 
of dummies’ to conceal his beneficial 
interest in Swiss Capital. The General 
Director accuses Mamatdjanov and 
Swiss Capital of engaging in various 
illegal activities. He claims that 
Mamatdjanov boasts of his corrupt 
ties with employees in the General 
Prosecutor’s office in Uzbekistan. The 
court concluded that Sukharev was 
within his rights to raise these concerns 
with the relevant authorities. 
While it is unclear if anything happened 
as a result of this complaint in 
Uzbekistan, Surkharev’s concerns 
appear to have attracted the interest of 
the Russian authorities. We know this 
from an appeal decision published by 
the criminal division of the Stavropol 
Regional Court. The appeal was lodged 
by the ‘suspect’ ‘Farkhod Mamatdjanov’, 
and it relates to a Pyatigorsk City Court 
decision to freeze property belonging to 
‘Swiss XXXX’ - the rest of the company’s 
name is redacted.84 This freezing order 
was made in response to a request by 
the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Investigators claimed it was necessary 
as ‘this property will continue to be 
used by members of organized criminal 
groups as another means of committing 
a crime’. The Appeal Court upheld the 
freezing order.
In summary, internal Swiss Capital 
records appear to support the contention 
that Farkhod Mamatdjanov is a person 
who has had significant control over 
Swiss Capital. This claim has also been 
made by a senior Russian executive 
responsible for a firm part-owned by 
the group. Following this allegation a 
Russian criminal investigation linked 
Mamatdjanov to the firm ‘Swiss XXXX’.
Criminal investigators claim that 
Mamatdjanov has been using the 
company to participate in organised 
criminal activities. A Russian appeals 
court was persuaded to uphold an asset 
freezing order related to this case.  
Consideration will now turn to the 
British entity, Wayrex LLP, cited in the 
email exchange between Tulyaganov 
and Schafflützel. It appears to be a key 
vehicle in the Uztex-InFinBank group, 
and one which documents indicate 
loaned significant sums to Swiss Capital.
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On 16 January 2009 both members 
resigned. They were replaced by 
Eurotex Commercial Ltd, and Polymer 
Trading Group Ltd.86 
According to the offshore entities 
database curated by the International 
Consortium of Investigate Journalists 
(ICIJ), Eurotex Commercial Ltd has a 
single shareholder, Iminov Abdumalik 
Validjanovich.87 Corporate filings 
submitted by Uzbekistani JSC Alfa 
Group, indicate Iminov was elected to 
its board during 2012.88 Alfa Group’s 
principal shareholder is Wayrex LLP. 
Eurotex Commercial Ltd’s Director is 
recorded as being Markus Waldvogel 
in ICIJ’s offshore database. Waldvogel 
would go on to serve as a Director at 
Swiss Capital International Group AG 
from 29 April 2013 until 21 August 2014.89 
With respect to Polymer Trading 
Group Ltd, the ICIJ database indicates 
‘Mamatdjanov Farkhod Fakhritdinovich’ 
was sole shareholder.90 Jean-Claude 
Beaujean is listed as the company’s 
Director.
Subsequently the Marshall Islands 
registered International Business 
Companies, Kenmark Inc, and Ostberg 
Ltd, replaced Eurotex and Polymer 
Trading, as Wayrex LLP members.
85 Wayrex LLP, Application for Incorporation of a Limited Liability Partnership, Companies House, 1 February 2005, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC311533/filing-history?page=2 (accessed 17 February 2020)
86 See Wayrex LLP filings dated 16 January 2009, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC311533/filing-history?page=2 (accessed 17 
February 2020)
87 Eurotex Commercial Ltd, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Offshore Leaks Database, available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/
nodes/197109 (accessed 20 February 2020)
88 Alfa Group JSC, Essential Facts 9, 14 June 2012, available online: www.biznes-daily.uz/ru/2010-12-09-08-26-52/7915-alfa-group-sp-oao (accessed 30 
December 2019)
89 See https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.xhtml?uid=CHE-116.256.847# (accessed 20 February 2020)
90 Polymer Trading Group Ltd, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Offshore Leaks Database, available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.
org/nodes/197110  (accessed 20 February 2020)
91 Archived website available online: https://web.archive.org/web/20181218183323/http://wayrex.com/aboutus (accessed 20 February 2020)
WAYREX LLP
Wayrex LLP is an English Limited Liability Partnership. It was 
established on 14 February 2005 with two founding members, 
Ireland & Overseas Acquisitions LTD a firm incorporated in the 
British Virgin Islands, and Milltown Corporate Services, also 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.85
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Wayrex LLP’s website, which is now 
offline, was accessed using the 
Wayback Machine archival tool. The 
website contains no information on 
managers, directors or shareholders. 
It describes the LLP’s mission as:
Wayrex Holding Company is focused 
on creating an integrated company. 
Wayrex Holding Company includes 
several business divisions. Each 
business division is managed by a 
Executive Director of Wayrex Holding 
Company. To implement even 
larger-scale investment programs, 
the holding company would like to 
cooperate with strategic partners. 
The goal of the Wayrex Holding 
Company investment strategy is to 
ensure sustainable development and 
high profit margins for the company. 
The implementation of the strategy 
will result in the long-term growth of 
the company’s business value.91
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The first media accounts, from July 
2005, refer to Wayrex LLP as a British 
company investing in Guzor Flour LLC. 
It was reported that Wayrex LLP 
had provided 56.3% of the US$1.77 
million investment.92 Later reports 
from 2009 claim Wayrex LLP was 
preparing to invest a further US$1 
million into two companies it founded, 
TashBrunnentex, and Bursel Tashkent 
Textile.93 TashBrunnentex would be 
rebranded Uztex Tashkent (the majority 
of Uztex Tashkent’s shares are now 
held through an opaque Singapore 
offshore entity, Eastex Systems Pte 
Ltd). In a 2016 UK government media 
release documenting a diplomatic trip 
to Uzbekistani-British joint ventures, 
Uztex Shovot was reported to be owned 
by Wayrex LLP (at the time of writing, 
Uztex Shovot shares are now held 
primarily by New Medical Edwards LLP, 
its PSC is Jean Claude Beaujean).94 
Finally, Wayrex LLP through its 99.99% 
stake in Alfa Group, has held a significant 
interest in InFinBank.
Following transparency reforms to the 
UK companies law, on 14 February 2017 
Wayrex LLP declared one PSC, Jean 
Claude Beaujean.95 Beaujean claims to 
have significant influence or control 
over the entity, rather than a beneficial 
ownership interest. 
As noted above, Beaujean has acted as 
a Director of Polymer Trading Group 
Ltd, a Wayrex LLP member owned 
by Farkhod Mamatdjanov (according 
to the ICIJ database), and in addition 
served on the board of Alfa Group.96 
Alongside these business roles, 
Beaujean was reportedly appointed 
Honorary Consul of Belgium in 1998 
by the King of Belgium.97 As late as 
December 2019, Beaujean continues to 
be cited in Uzbekistani media releases 
by this title.98 Karl Lagatie, head of 
press at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, did not respond to multiple 
requests for confirmation of Beaujean’s 
appointment. Beaujean also served 
as a board member at the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Uzbekistan 
from 1999 to 2015.99
While data from Uzbekistan and 
Switzerland indicates Wayrex LLP has 
held significant a major industrial-
finance interests, accounts filed with 
the UK’s Company House consistently 
depict Wayrex LLP as a small firm 
‘active as a trade agent for polymeric 
raw materials’.100 Its annual commissions 
for trade agency work have been under 
£50,000 per annum since 2009, while 
its assets, primarily constituted by 
cash, has slowly accumulated to 
£226,530.101 
92 ‘New joint venture opens in Uzbekistan’, Business Press, 20 July 2005, available online: www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mId_21960_aId_347174.
html (accessed 20 February 2020)
93 ‘Uzbekyengilsanoat signs agreements on attraction of investments to Navoi FIEZ’, Uz Daily, 2 November 2009, available online: uzdaily.com/en/post/7785 
(accessed 30 December 2019)
94 ‘Deputy Ambassador visits regions in Uzbekistan’, Government of the United Kingdom, British Embassy Tashkent, 22 February 2016, available online: https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/deputy-ambassador-visits-regions-in-uzbekistan (accessed 30 December 2019)
95 Wayrex LLP, Persons with Significant Control Notification, Companies House, 14 February 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/OC311533/filing-history (accessed 30 January 2019)
96 Alfa Group JSC, Annual Report 2016, Openinfo.uz, available online: https://openinfo.uz/ru/reports/4983/ (accessed 20/1/2020)
97 ‘Profile - AmCham Director Jean Claude Beaujean’, Business Connections, 2006/4, available online: www.silkpress.com/discovery-bc/archive/2006.4/10_8.
php (accessed 20 January 2020)
98 ‘Celebratory concert in the framework of the project “Days of European Languages" at UMED’, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, 16 December 2019, 
available online: www.uwed.uz/ru/news/fulltext/1048  (accessed 8 January 2020)
99 Jean Claude Beaujean, Facebook Profile, available online: https://www.facebook.com/jeanclaude.beaujean.10/
about?lst=560523192%3A1522430714%3A1579683563 (accessed 20 January 2020) 
100 See, for example, Wayrex LLP, Report of the Members for the Financial Period 1.03.2018 to 28.02.2019, Companies House, 16 May 2019, available online: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC311533/filing-history (accessed 21 February 2020)
101 See financial filings available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC311533/filing-history (accessed 21 February 2020)
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A similar pattern of corporate 
disclosure may be observed with 
other British entities, where Beaujean 
is a declared PSC. Maritex Industrial 
LLP, DF Industries LLP, and New 
Medical Edwards LLP all majority own 
significant companies in the Uztex 
group.102 In UK filings they claim to be 
trade agents, earning minor revenues 
from commissions, with modest assets 
constituted primarily by cash in the 
bank. All three have declared Beaujean 
a PSC on the basis that he exercises 
significant control over the firm, rather 
than due to a beneficial interest. 
Despite the negligible sums appearing 
on Wayrex LLP’s financial filings, 
internal Swiss Capital records indicate 
that it has provided them with over 
CHF7 million in loans. While more 
widely speaking Wayrex LLP has been 
a key offshore vehicle used to hold 
shares in Uztex companies at various 
stages over the previous decade, and in 
InFinBank (via Alfa Group). 
Attention will now turn to the Rieter 
group. Rieter is not part of Uztex. It is, 
however, an industrial supplier 
to Uztex, and is cited in a series of 
leaked documents involving irregular 
transactions. 
102 Corporate register filings for Maritex Industrial LLP, DF Industries, LLP, and New Medical Edwards LLP, can be accessed online: https://beta.companieshouse.
gov.uk/ (accessed 21 February 2020)
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'Rieter is the world’s leading supplier of systems for short-staple fiber spinning. 
Based in Winterthur (Switzerland), the company develops and manufactures 
machinery, systems and components used to convert natural and manmade 
fibers and their blends into yarns. Rieter is the only supplier worldwide to cover 
spinning preparation processes as well as all four end spinning processes 
currently established on the market. Furthermore, Rieter is a leader in the 
field of precision winding machines. With 16 manufacturing locations in ten 
countries, the company employs a global workforce of some 5,150, about 20% 
of whom are based in Switzerland'.103
103 Rieter (2019) Annual Report 2018, 12 March, p.4, available online: https://www.rieter.com/fileadmin/user_upload/investor-relations/documents/
reports/2018/rieter-annual-report-2018-en.pdf (accessed 10 January 2020)
104 Rieter (2019) Annual Report 2018, 12 March, p.7, available online: https://www.rieter.com/fileadmin/user_upload/investor-relations/documents/
reports/2018/rieter-annual-report-2018-en.pdf (accessed 10 January 2020)
105 Ibid.
106 Uztex Tashkent LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.26365, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 October 2019.
RIETER GROUP
Rieter is a Swiss multinational headquartered in Winterthur. 
It supplies textile machinery globally, with over US$1 billion 
in revenues. It has subsidiaries in Belgium, Brazil, China, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Netherlands, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, USA and Uzbekistan. 
In Rieter’s 2018 Annual Report the company claims:
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Uzbekistan is a significant regional 
portfolio for Rieter. The 2018 Annual 
Report states that in Asia ‘Rieter 
increased sales in the reporting 
year by 36% to CHF433.9 million, of 
which Uzbekistan made a significant 
contribution of CHF144.1 million’. 104 
This reflected the fact that sales in 
Uzbekistan increased by 70% in 2018. 
By contrast ‘in 2018, sales in China 
fell by 19% to CHF148.6 million’.105 
Given that Uztex is arguably the largest 
textile firm in Uzbekistan, it is not 
unusual that they are an important 
Rieter client. However, evidence 
indicates that this relationship goes 
beyond customer and supplier. For 
example, Rieter Machine Works Ltd 
has a stake (3.52%) in Uztex Tashkent, 
a company previously known as 
Tashbrunnentex.106 The other 
shareholders include Dilshod 
Mamatdjanov, the brother of Farkhod, 
and Eastex Systems Pte Ltd, an opaque 
Singapore holding vehicle.
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Rieter group’s General Counsel, Thomas 
Anwander, in correspondence dated 
18 October 2019, initially stated that 
Rieter did not own shares in the Uztex 
group: ‘This information is not correct. 
Neither Rieter Machine Works Ltd nor 
any other company of the Rieter Group 
is a shareholder in Uzteks Tashkent or 
in any other company in Uzbekistan 
except than Rieter Uzbekistan’.107 
A copy of Uztex Tashkent’s 
shareholder information, obtained 
from Uzbekistan’s unified register of 
legal entities, was supplied to Rieter. 
In response Rieter General Counsel 
clarified the previous representation, 
stating that in fact the company does 
have an interest in Uztex: 
Rieter Machine Works Ltd received 
some shares in a company called 
Tashbrunnentex in the context of a 
financial restructuring about 10 years 
ago. We thought these shares have 
been divested in the meantime. Based 
on the information received we realised 
that this has not been the case.108
This response references the 
approximate period when 
Tashbrunnentex was founded by 
Wayrex LLP and another Swiss 
firm, Chastex AG (which was later 
liquidated).109 Chastex AG’s sole director 
was Markus Waldvogel who is tied 
both to Wayrex LLP, and Swiss Capital 
International Group AG, where he has 
acted in an executive capacity.110 
Uztex and Rieter are also tied by shared 
personnel. Jurg Wieser, for example, 
served as a director at Swiss Capital 
International Group from 7 September 
2015 until 18 July 2017.111 At the same 
time Wieser was on the Board at the 
Joh. Jacob Rieter-Stiftung Foundation, 
which is Rieter’s Swiss charitable arm.112 
He also served previously as a head of 
human resources at Rieter.113 Another 
Rieter executive, Jens-Uwe Bockhahn, 
served as a Swiss Capital director from 
1 November 2011 until 29 November 
2011.114 In a 2010 Rieter company 
magazine Bockhahn is listed as Rieter 
group’s Central Asia sales manager.115  
Next is the example of Alisher Razakov. 
Razakov’s LinkedIn profile states he is 
head of Central Asia for Rieter Machine 
Works AG (a media reports claims he 
is Rieter's Uzbekistan agent).116 While 
Dr Muzaffar Razakov is listed as CEO of 
Rieter Uzbekistan.117
In the previous section on Swiss Capital 
International Group AG, Alisher Razakov 
was characterised as a business 
partner of Farkhod Mamatdjanov in 
email correspondence. This framing is 
further supported by a 2016 VP Bank 
annual account statement, cited above, 
for Farkhod Mamatdjanov. It features 
a number of noteworthy transactions. 
First, is a CHF3 million payment to 
Mamatdjanov on 28 April 2016. The 
following transaction description 
appears on the statement: ‘Herr Alisher 
Razakov U/O, Herr Muzaffar Razakov’.118 
This money appears to have been used 
to purchase a property at the Hard Turm 
Park development in Zurich, during 
the same time-period when Swiss 
Capital International Group moved its 
headquarters to the development. 
107 Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 18 October 2019.
108 Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 20 December 2019.
109 On the Investment Program of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2008, Decree President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 9 October 2007, No.PP-704, available 
online: https://www.lex.uz/acts/1257293 (accessed 30 December 2019)
110 Chastex AG, Commercial Register of Schwyz Canton, available online: https://www.shabex.ch/co/exc/chastex_ag_in_liquidation_CH-400.3.019.921-0.htm 
(accessed 30 December 2019)  
111 Swiss Capital International Group, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, available online: https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.
xhtml?uid=CHE-116.256.847 (accessed 10 December 2019)  
112 Joh. Jacob Rieter-Stiftung, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, available online: https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.
xhtml?uid=CHE-102.038.534# (accessed 30 December 2019)
113 Rieter, Annual Report 2003, 23 March 2004, available online: https://www.rieter.com/fileadmin/user_upload/investor-relations/documents/reports/2003/
rieter-annual-report-2003-en.pdf (accessed 30 December 2019); ‘Winterthur meets the Thurgau’, Tagblatt, 14 May 2012, available online: https://www.
tagblatt.ch/ostschweiz/frauenfeld-munchwilen/winterthur-trifft-den-thurgau-ld.910988  (accessed 30 December 2019)
114 Swiss Capital International Group, Commercial Register of Zurich Canton, available online: https://zh.chregister.ch/cr-portal/auszug/auszug.
xhtml?uid=CHE-116.256.847 (accessed 2 February 2020)  
115 Rieter (2010) Link, Vol.22 No.54, p.9, January, available online: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/4909176/link-1-2010-04-trends-markets-
belarus-textile-market-on-rieter (accessed 2 February 2020)
116 Alisher Razakov, LinkedIn Profile, available online: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alisher-razakov-53320a2/  (accessed 10 December 2019)
117 Dr. Muzaffar Razakov, LinkedIn Profile, available online: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-muzaffar-razakov-5b6a804/ (accessed 10 December 2019)
118 Account Statement, Mamatdjanov Farkhod, 01/04/2016 - 31/12/2016, VP Bank.
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119 Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 18 October 2019.
120 Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 20 December 2019.
121 Bellmax Management Ltd, Persons with Significant Control Notification, Companies House, 1 March 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.
uk/company/07971316/filing-history (accessed 21 February 2020)
There are additional VP Bank transactions 
from 2016 involving Alisher Razakov. 
For example, on 1 July 2016, CHF800,000 
is transferred to Farkhod Mamatdjanov 
by Nargiza Mamatdjanova in Tashkent. 
Four days later on 5 July, CHF800,000 is 
transferred to Alisher Razakov. Then 
on 9 December 2016, CHF2.2 million is 
transferred to Farkhod Mamatdjanov, 
the payment is described as ‘pay-out 
mortgage contract no.826050’. The 
same day CHF2,200,010 is transferred 
from Mamatdjanov to Alisher Razakov. 
In total CHF3 million is paid out to 
Alisher Razakov, following the earlier 
credit to Mamatdjanov’s account in 
the same amount, referencing Alisher 
Razakov and Muzaffar Razakov.
Rieter’s General Counsel was alerted 
to these transactions through 
correspondence in October 2019. 
He responded, ‘we kindly ask you to 
provide us with trustful copies of the 
respective bank statements so we 
can follow up on this matter also in 
terms of compliance with our Code of 
Conduct’.119 A copy of the statement 
was provided. Rieter’s General Counsel 
advised: ‘The copies you provided 
us show transactions between Mr 
Mamatdjanov and Mr Razakoffs 
private bank account. Obviously these 
transactions do not relate to any 
business matters, so we are [sic] in 
the position to comment on them’.120
Other links exist between the Razakovs 
and Mamatdjanov.  For example, in PSC 
filings submitted to Companies House 
in the UK for Bellmax Management Ltd, 
Alisher Razakov lists his correspondence 
address as 98 Pfingstweid Street, 
Zurich, 8005.121 This is the location 
of the Head Office for Swiss Capital 
International Group AG. 
In light of the above evidence it can 
be concluded that, in addition to being 
an important supplier of industrial 
equipment to Uztex, Rieter has a 
number of additional ties with the 
group. They have a shareholding in 
Uztex through Uztex Tashkent. Uztex 
and Rieter also have had shared senior 
personnel. One individual appears to be 
both a senior representative for Rieter 
in Central Asia, and a key interlocutor 
with Mamatdjanov and the Swiss 
Capital International Group. These 
factors will assume greater significance 
in the next section, which focuses on 
a series of commercial transactions 
between Uztex and Rieter. 
Out of the Cauldron, into the Fire? 41
122 On Measures to Introduce Modern Forms of Organizing Cotton-Textile Production, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 25 January 2018, available 
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125 Textile Finance Khorezm LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.118, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 28 September 2019.
126 Contract No.21425014, Textile Finance Khorezm LLC and Rieter Machine Works Ltd, 10 May 2017.
127 Contract No.21529101, Textile Finance Namangan LLC and Rieter Machine Works Ltd, 27 September 2017.
128 Agreement between Textile Finance Khorezm LLC, Rieter Machine Works Ltd, and Wayrex LLP, 19 October 2017; Agreement between Textile Finance Namangan 
LLC, Rieter Machine Works Ltd, and Wayrex LLP, 19 October 2017.
129 Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 18 October 2019.
A ‘BOOMERANG’ SALES 
CONTRACT BETWEEN 
UZTEX AND RIETER
During 2017 Uztex and Rieter 
entered negotiations over 
the supply of US$84 million 
in equipment for two of 
Uztex’s operations, Textile 
Finance Namangan LLC and 
Textile Finance Khorezm LLC. 
Textile Finance Namangan 
has been awarded a 9,836 
hectare cluster in Uchkurgan 
district, while Textile Finance 
Khorezm has been awarded a 
9,630 cluster in the Shavatsky 
district.122 Both clusters are 
serviced by InFinBank.
When company extracts were checked 
during 2019, Textile Finance Namangan’s 
shares were 100% owned by Maritex 
Industrial LLP.123 Maritex is a British 
limited liability partnership.124 Its PSC 
is Jean Claude Beaujean. In its financial 
filings Maritex Industrial claims to be 
a trade agent, with minimal assets 
and revenue. The 2019 extracts check 
revealed that the Uztex holding entity 
for Textile Finance Khorezm was Swiss 
Capital International Group, which had  
a 96.59% stake in the company.125 
The industrial deal being brokered 
between Rieter and these two Uztex 
companies, was facilitated initially 
through two sales contracts. The first 
contract is dated 10 May 2017. It is 
between Textile Finance Khorezm and 
Rieter Machine Works.126 The contract 
is for Rieter equipment, and it is in an 
amount of US$55,186,400. The second 
contract is dated 27 September 2017.  
It is between Textile Finance Namangan 
LLC and Rieter Machine Works. The 
contract is for Rieter equipment, and  
is in the amount of US$28,401,000.127
However, it appears a second set of 
contracts were subsequently drafted.128 
In this second set of contracts, the 
supply of industrial equipment is 
outsourced by Rieter to a third party, 
Wayrex LLP, with the agreement of 
Uztex. According to these contracts 
the third party will, in turn, source 
the industrial equipment, and then 
facilitate the machinery’s installation. 
Rieter will then be billed for the costs 
with relevant documentation. A US 
dollar transfer to Wayrex LLP will be 
made, the contracts note, after Rieter 
has received payment from Uztex for 
the initial contract. Under the contracts 
Rieter will retain a handling fee of 
US$150,000. 
When questioned about this arrangement, 
Rieter’s General Counsel explained: 
‘It is a common practice in our industry 
that a machine manufactures like 
Rieter are trusted with the coordination 
of different suppliers’.129
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However, there are two features of the 
second set of contracts, which appear 
to depart from ‘common practice’, 
as set out by Rieter. First, they are 
not supply agreements with other 
producers of textile machinery. The 
third party in these agreements has 
been contracted to source a supplier of 
machinery. So, rather than supply the 
machinery directly, or coordinate the 
supply of such machinery from third 
party producers, Rieter has outsourced 
the outsourcing of the machinery for 
Uztex. The third party tasked by Rieter 
with implementing this US$84 million 
deal is Wayrex LLP, a core offshore 
vehicle used in the Uztex group. 
In other words, under the agreements 
Uztex was contracting Rieter to 
supply US$84 million in machinery 
to Textile Finance Namangan and 
Textile Finance Khorezm. Rieter then 
handed this job over to Wayrex LLP, 
a significant offshore vehicle in the 
Uztex group. Wayrex LLP, in turn, 
agreed to source the machinery, and 
facilitate its installation, billing Rieter 
for the costs. This money would only 
be paid, however, after Uztex had 
transferred funds to Rieter under the 
initial contracts. So, in effect, Uztex 
contracted Rieter to supply machinery, 
then Rieter sub-contracted Uztex to 
source suppliers for this machinery;  
in turn, Uztex agreed to pay Rieter, 
while Rieter then agreed to pay Uztex, 
upon evidence Wayrex LLP had sourced 
and facilitated the equipment’s 
installation, and only after Rieter had 
received payment from the Uztex 
companies party to the initial sales 
contracts. 
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But would this irregular contractual 
complexion have been apparent to 
Rieter? If we work on an assumption 
that Rieter and Uztex were two 
companies entirely unfamiliar with 
each other’s operations, which is not 
the case, the arrangement still should 
have raised concerns. 
First, at the time the contracts with 
Wayrex LLP were drafted in 2017, its 
corporate filings, signed by Ali Moulaye, 
claim the limited liability partnership 
was a ‘trade agent for polymeric 
raw materials’, for which it receives 
commissions. Its total assets were 
£180,342, constituted mainly by cash 
at bank or in hand. This information 
did not indicate that Wayrex LLP 
had relevant industry experience 
in sourcing textile machinery, or 
facilitating its installation.
Publicly accessible corporate filings 
made in Uzbekistan, alongside media 
reports, made it apparent that Wayrex 
LLP was tied to the Uztex group.130 
The former filings also revealed that 
Wayrex LLP majority owned Alfa Group, 
a company with a range of additional 
interests, including shares in InFinBank. 
When the deal was made between 
Rieter and Wayrex LLP, Wayrex had one 
declared PSC, Jean Claude Beaujean. 
He had also been declared PSC for a 
number of other entities, including 
Maritex Industrial LLP and DF Industries 
LLP. It was apparent at the time based 
off public filings in Uzbekistan, both 
entities were again tied to Uztex’s 
operations.131
However, the above assessment is 
based on an assumption that Rieter 
and Uztex are entities with no prior 
links. We know that during the period in 
which these contracts were negotiated 
Uztex and Rieter had various ties. 
First, a former senior Rieter executive, 
Jurg Wieser, was director at Swiss 
Capital International Group until  
18 July 2017, arguably one of the 
most significant organs in the Uztex-
InFinBank group. At the same time Wieser 
was sitting on the board of Rieter’s 
Swiss charitable arm. Jens-Uwe Bockhahn 
also served briefly as a Swiss Capital 
director during 2011. In a 2010 Rieter 
company brochure, Bockhahn is 
described as their Central Asia sales 
manager. Other senior Rieter 
representatives for the Central Asia 
region enjoyed close business 
associations with Farkhod Mamatdjanov, 
a key Uztex figure, and Swiss Capital. 
Alisher Razakov is the principal example. 
Finally, Rieter had obtained shares in a 
Uztex joint venture, which was founded 
by Wayrex LLP. 
Therefore, it would appear that Rieter 
was in a good position to know its client 
Uztex, and the third party contractor, 
Wayrex LLP, an Uztex offshore entity. 
Rieter’s General Counsel Thomas 
Anwander was asked why the 
contracting parties – Uztex and Rieter 
– would agree to Rieter outsourcing 
the identification of a supplier to an 
Uztex offshore vehicle, that on paper 
is a trade agent for polymeric raw 
materials. In response to this query 
Rieter’s General Counsel claims the 
contract with Textile Finance Khorezm 
and Wayrex LLP, in the end, did not 
proceed. He confirmed, however, that 
the contracts with Textile Finance 
Namangan and Wayrex LLP did proceed. 
Anwander then notes:
As explained in our last letter it is a 
common practice in our industry that 
machine manufactures like Rieter 
are trusted with the coordination of 
different suppliers. Also for the project 
Textile Finance Namangan Rieter 
coordinated in cooperation with  
Wayrex LLP the scope of other 
suppliers than Rieter like Savio,  
Uster and Sohler-Neuenhauser.132
130 ‘Innovative activity in the textile industry’, Biznes Daily, 19 April 2012, available online: http://biznes-daily.uz/uz/gazeta-birja/2425-toqimachilik-sanoatida-
innovatsion-faoliyat (accessed 1 January 2020); ‘Deputy Ambassador visits regions in Uzbekistan’, Government of the United Kingdom, British Embassy 
Tashkent, 22 February 2016, available online: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deputy-ambassador-visits-regions-in-uzbekistan (accessed 
30 December 2019); Tursunova, A. (2016) ‘In the regions of Uzbekistan’, Biznes Daily, 26 February, available online: www.biznes-daily.uz/ru/mening-
mulkim/36380-v-rgionax-uzbkistana (accessed 1 January 2020).
131 Aysel-Invest JSC, Material Fact Disclosure No.6, 9 December 2016, available online: https://openinfo.uz/ru/facts/7471/ (accessed 20 February 2020) Letter 
from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 20 December 2019.
132 Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 20 December 2019.
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This response, however, does not 
explain why Rieter would be charged 
with finding suppliers by Uztex, only 
then to outsource this task back to an 
Uztex offshore company.
Farkhod Mamatdjanov and the Uztex 
group did not respond to requests for 
comment.133 
In isolation these series of contracts 
between Uztex and Rieter would be 
a matter of concern when assessing 
the integrity of Uztex, a company 
which is among the most important in 
Uzbekistan’s cotton cluster system. 
However, in the previous subsections 
additional red flags were pointed to. 
Cumulatively this evidence indicates 
that Uztex fails to exhibit traits which 
would qualify it as a ‘responsible 
investor’. That Uztex was appointed 
to operate clusters under opaque 
conditions, without open competition 
or transparency, is an additional matter 
of concern.
However, as the next section of this 
report demonstrates, Uztex is not 
an isolated example of major cluster 
operators exhibiting evidence of 
multiple bad practices.
Postscript: In a report published on 
20 February 2020, a group of farmers 
have raised concerns to Radio Ozodlik 
over the cluster operations of Uztex 
company, Shovot Tekstil.134 According 
to farmers the district hokimiyat and 
cluster operator have forced them to 
sign a cotton cultivation agreement 
based on the ‘interests of the cluster 
only’. They complained of ‘unfair 
insurance conditions, inflated prices for 
fertilizer and diesel and a monopoly of 
the cluster in the district which leaves 
farmers no right to choose which 
cluster to work with’. 
One farmer, who asked not to be 
named, told Ozodlik that due to 
overpriced products, and despite 
fulfilling the cotton target, he was left 
in debt to the cluster. Another farmer 
said the cluster had established its own 
insurance company and retained UZS30 
million (approximately $3,000 US) from 
farmers last year. It is alleged that 
farmers who were unable to fulfil the 
plan because of circumstances outside 
their control, received no compensation 
from the insurance policy. 
It is also claimed that the contract 
obliges farmers to pay the salaries 
of the cluster’s agronomist, business 
manager and other employees. 
133 Both written and email correspondence was sent by the authors.
134 Ashur, S. (2020) ‘In Khorezm, farmers are forced to sign contracts that only take into account the interests of the cluster’, Radio Ozodlik, 20 February, available 
online: https://www.ozodlik.org/a/klaster-shovot-fermer/30445664.html (accessed 16 April 2020)
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135 On Measures to Introduce Modern Forms of Organizing Cotton-Textile Production, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 25 January 2018, available 
online: www.lex.uz/ru/docs/3527483 (accessed 11 October 2019)
136 On Additional Measures for the Further Development of Cotton and Textile Industries, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.744, 19 
September 2018, available online: https://www.lex.uz/docs/3906242 (accessed 2 February 2020)
137 On Measures to Further Expand the Volumes of Cotton and Textile Production in the Regions of the Republic, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, No.914, 18 November 2019, available online: https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4599864 (accessed 1 January 2020)
138 On Measures to Further Expand the Volumes of Cotton and Textile Production in the Regions of the Republic, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, No.914, 18 November 2019, available online: https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4599864 (accessed 1 January 2020)
139 On Measures for the Further Development of Cotton and Textile Industries, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.230, available online: 
https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4245407 (accessed 21 January 2020)
Included in the September 2018 decree is the 
7,000 hectare Amudarya District cluster (Republic 
of Karakalpakstan). It is operated by a joint-venture, 
Amudaryotex LLC. Subsequently, this cluster 
has been expanded to 8,104 hectares.137 The 
September 2018 decree also notes a 6,400 hectare 
cotton cluster in Tashkent’s Chinaz district.  
It is operated by the Textile Technologies Group.  
Subsequently, the group has been awarded 
clusters in the Mirzachul district (11,500 hectares), 
Arnasay district (8,400 hectares), and Bekabad 
district (12,000 hectares).138
On 18 March 2019, a Cabinet of Ministers 
resolution expanded the cluster system further. 
One of the new cluster operators is Beshariq 
Tekstil. It has been awarded an 8,000 hectare 
cluster in Ferghana’s Beshariq district.139   
All three of these cluster operators are linked  
by a set of interconnected business people.  
A documentary trail evidences that two of the 
corporate operators cited above (Beshariq Tekstil 
JSC and Amudaryotex LLC) are directly tied to  
a financial scandal that left Russia’s Starbank 
bankrupt. 
IV
On 19 September 2018, a Cabinet of Ministers decree was passed. It announced 
a rapid expansion of the cotton cluster system. At the start of the year thirteen 
clusters had been introduced covering 132,808 acres.135  By September a further 
44 clusters were established, covering 300,713 acres.136 
PART IV 
RUSSIA’S STARBANK SCANDAL AND 
UZBEKISTAN’S CLUSTER SYSTEM
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Table 9: Cluster ownership profiles140
Cluster Operator Charter Capital 
(USD)
Shareholders PSC




* Shares transfer 2019
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov  
(Welroy Technology)









$74,608,683 Textile Technologies 
Group Limited (100%)
Murat Yakubov  
(also known as Murat Yakubzhanov)
Beshariq Beshariq Tekstil JSC $3,981,489 Vertical Alliance LLP 
(94.17%)
Genmark Furniture MCHJ 
(minority shareholding)
Agadzhan Avanesov (Vertical 
Alliance)
Vakhid Artykov (Vertical Alliance)
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov  
(Genmark Furniture)
Murat Yakubov (also known as Murat 
Yakubzhanov) (Genmark Furniture)
140 Amudaryotex LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.94, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 8 January 2019; Amudaryotex LLC, Company Extract, 
Reg No.94, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 8 July 2019; Welroy Technology Ltd, Notice of Individual Person with Significant Control, 
13 November 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06857165/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020); Beshariq 
Tekstil JSC, Company Extract, Reg No.35/2,  Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 December 2019; Vertical Alliance LLP, Notification of 
a Person with Significant Control of a Limited Liability Partnership, Companies House, 2 April 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/OC321610/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020); Genmark Furniture LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.19866, Unified Portal of Interactive Public 
Services, accessed 22 December 2019; Metal Engineering Group LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.19866, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 
22 December 2019; Emerging Markets Forum, 2019 Eurasia Meeting, Participants' Profiles, January 27-29, Gerzensee, Switzerland, available online: www.
emergingmarketsforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Participants-Profiles.pdf (accessed 24 February 2020); Textile Technologies Group LLC, Company 
Extract, Reg No.180, Unified Portal Of Interactive Public Services, accessed 14 January 2019. 
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According to news reports from 2013 
Amudaryotex was founded by the 
British company Welroy Technology 
Limited, with an investment of US$29 
million.141 Welroy Technology Limited 
exhibits a number of red flags. 
It was incorporated in England on 
24 March 2009, by Corporate 
Management and Secretaries Limited. 
Initially, New Zealand citizen Rachel 
Amy Erickson was the company’s sole 
director and shareholder.142 According 
to the Organised Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project (OCCRP), ‘Erickson is 
former girlfriend of Ian Taylor. Taylor 
is co-founder of GT Group, a business 
registration firm based in Auckland, 
New Zealand, that specialized in setting 
up untraceable offshore companies, 
fronted by proxies. Many of the firm's 
businesses have been used by organized 
crime including the Sinaloa Drug cartel, 
Russian officials who stole $230 million 
in tax money, the North Korean 
government and others’.143 
Erickson informed OCCRP that a large 
number of companies were being 
established at the address, 8 Shepherd 
Market, with her forged credentials. 
This is the same street address initially 
used by Welroy Technology. In an email 
reported on in a UK High Court case 
Erickson claims she was the victim of 
identity theft.144 
When Welroy Technology was awarded 
the Amudarya District cluster through 
its Uzbekistani subsidiary, Erickson no 
longer appeared on company filings 
as a director/shareholder. She had 
been replaced by King Howard Cordero 
Enriquez, a Filipino national. He has been 
described in a UK High Court judgement 
as a professional nominee.145 Enriquez 
was also one of four nominee directors 
appointed to companies reportedly 
involved in a Ukrainian fraud case, the 
other three were Ian Taylor, Rachel Amy 
Erickson and Angelique Elizabeth Lilley.146 
While media reports place the foreign 
investment channelled to Uzbekistan 
for Amudaryotex at US$29 million, in 
filings submitted to the UK registrar of 
companies, Welroy Technology claims 
it is a dormant company with £1000 in 
assets, being totally made up of share 
capital.147 This would appear well short 
of the asset levels required to make, or 
secure, the type of investment reported 
on in the Uzbekistani media.148 The 
dormant nature of the company also 
appears to be in question, given its 
Uzbekistani operations. 
On 6 April 2016, Welroy Technology 
Ltd declared a person with significant 
control (PSC). According to their filing 
Mirakbar Iakubzhanov, a resident of 
Kyrgyzstan, owns over 75% of the 
company. This is a spelling variation 
of Yakubzhanov, which is used in 
Uzbekistani filings. The 73 year old 
citizen of Kyrgyzstan is also the major 
registered shareholder in another 
Uzbekistani company, Metal Engineering 
Group LLC.
When checked in December 2019, 
Metal Engineering Group LLC’s file on 
Uzbekistan’s unified register of legal 
entities reveals it is owned by:
 Textile Technologies Group (9.4%)
 Salubris Vita (9%) 
 Kalorama (68.1%) 
 Mirakbar Yakubzhanov (13.51%)
149
141 ‘By the end of the year in Karakalpakstan will launch the production of denim’, Podrobno.Uz, 13 August 2013, available online: https://podrobno.uz/cat/
economic/v-karakalpakii-zapustyat-proizvodstvo-djinsovoi-tkanni/ (accessed 28 December 2019)
142 Welroy Technology Ltd, Certificate of Incorporation of a Private Limited Company, Companies House, 24 March 2009, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06857165/filing-history?page=2 (accessed 24 February 2020)
143 ‘Owners battle for TV station’, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 24 May 2013, available online: https://www.occrp.org/en/component/
content/article?id=1960:owners-battle-for-tv-station-ru (accessed 19 September 2019)
144 Kagalovsky & Anor v Balmore Invest Ltd & Ors (Rev 1) [2013] EWHC 3876 (QB) (09 December 2013) 
145 Hniazdzilau v Vajgel & Ors [2016] EWHC 15 (Ch) (18 January 2016)
146 Kagalovsky & Anor v Balmore Invest Ltd & Ors (Rev 1) [2013] EWHC 3876 (QB) (09 December 2013) 
147 Welroy Technology Ltd, Dorman Accounts, Companies House, 31 March 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06857165/
filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020)
148 It is conceivable that the investment could have been financed through a loan guaranteed by an affiliated company or individual with an adequate asset base.
149 Metal Engineering Group LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.19866, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 December 2019.
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Kalorama’s shares are owned by 
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov.150 Shares in 
Salubris Vita151 are 99.94% owned by 
Probiotic Technology LLP,152 a ‘dormant’ 
limited liability partnership registered 
in the UK.153 Its owner is Mirakbar 
Yakubzhanov (spelt in the filings 
Mirakbar Iakubzhanov). Yakubzhanov 
is also owner of two other UK legal 
entities. Both declare themselves to 
be dormant. 
The 9.4% shareholder in Metal 
Engineering Group is Textile 
Technologies Group. During 2019 shares 
in Amudaryotex were transferred 
from Welroy Technology Ltd, to Textile 
Technologies Group. For a period during 
2018-2019 Welroy Technology Ltd had 
been dissolved via compulsory  
strike-off in the UK.154 
Like Welroy Technology Ltd, Textile 
Technologies Group is described as a 
foreign investor. A Ministry of Economy 
and Industry announcement dated 2016  
states that the Textile Technologies Group 
is South Korean.155 A company extract 
exists for a Textile Technologies Group 
Limited incorporated in Hong Kong, with 
a shareholder Janggon Jung registered 
to an apartment address in Seoul,  
South Korea.156 No additional information 
could be found on this individual.
However, a CV provided by Murat 
Yakubov for the Participant’s Profile 
at the 2019 Emerging Markets Forum 
convened in Switzerland, states 
that he has been the owner of both 
Textile Technologies Group and Metal 
Engineering Group since 2011.157 Prior to 
that Yakubov was a Deputy Governor 
at the Central Bank of Uzbekistan 
(2000-2003), before becoming the 
adviser to the Central Bank Chairman 
(2003-2011) at the age of 30. Currently, 
Yakubov is reportedly a partner at the 
international accountancy firm Grant 
Thornton and sits on the Board of 
the state owned Uzpromstroybank.158 
Government records indicate Yakubov  
is a former citizen of Kyrgyzstan,  
of Uzbek ethnicity.159 
Further examination of 
Uzpromstroybank’s public filings  
reveal that Yakubov’s full name is 
Murat Mirakbarovich Yakubzhanov.160 
Under Uzbek naming traditions this 
indicates he is the son of Mirakbar 
Yakubzhanov. A former business 
associate of the Yakubzhanov family, 
confirms Murat Yakubzhanov is the 
son of Mirakbar Yakubzhanov.161 
150 Kalorama, Company Extract, Reg No.000193-04, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 December 2019.
151 Salubris Vita LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.21049, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 December 2019.
152 It was reported in 2012 that Salubris Vita was overseeing a US$21 million investment in drugs for intestinal problems, see Ashurmatov, D. ‘The “incurable” 
pharmaceutical industry in Uzbekistan', The Times of Central Asia, 15 August 2014, available online: https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/14217-the-
incurable-pharmaceutical-industry-in-uzbekistan (accessed 22 December 2019)
153 Probiotic Technology LLP, Notification of a Person with Significant Control of a Limited Liability Partnership, Companies House, 13 November 2017, available 
online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC347593/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020)
154 The strike-off filings are available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06857165/filing-history (accessed 24 February 2020)
155 Ministry of Economics and Industry of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘Investment projects implemented with foreign direct investment and loans in 2016’, 26 
January 2016, available online: mineconomy.uz/ru/node/1091 (accessed 24 February 2020)
156 Textile Technologies Group Limited, Annual Return, Company Number 1384214, Hong Kong Companies Registry, 3 December 2018.
157 Emerging Markets Forum, 2019 Eurasia Meeting, Participants' Profiles, January 27-29, Gerzensee, Switzerland, available online: www.emergingmarketsforum.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Participants-Profiles.pdf (accessed 24 February 2020)
158 ‘Information about the members of the Board of JSCB Uzpromstroybank’, Uzpromstroybank, no date, available online: https://uzpsb.uz/general-information/
sovet-banka/ (accessed 26 February 2020)
159 On Renunciation of Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic, Decree, President of the Kyrgyz Republic, No.143, 26 July 2014, available online: http://www.president.
kg/files/docs/143_ukaz.pdf (accessed 24 February 2020)
160 Uzpromstroybank JSCB, Material Fact Disclosure No.8, Tashkent Republican Stock Exchange, 2 August 2019, available online: https://uzse.uz/reports/6281/
material_fact (accessed 24 February 2020)
161 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 4 March 2020.
Out of the Cauldron, into the Fire? 49
Textile Technologies Group’s General 
Manager is Dilshid Tajibaev. According 
to the most recent Annual Report for 
Joint Stock Company, Mebel, Tajibaev 
sits on its Supervisory Board.162 The 
two largest shareholders are Kalorama 
and Metal Engineering Group.163 Mebel 
has acted as a guarantor for loans 
received by the Textile Technologies 
Group.164 This provides further evidence 
that the claim of ownership made by 
Murat Yakubzhanov is accurate, Textile 
Technologies Group appears to be part 
of a wider circle of interests held by the 
Yakubzhanov family.
The formal bridge between the 
Yakubzhanov family and a Russian 
businessman at the centre of the 
Starbank scandal, Agadzhan Avanesov, 
is Beshariq Tekstil JSC. The minority 
shareholder is Genmark Furniture LLC, 
a subsidiary of the Metal Engineering 
Group.165
The majority owner is Vertical Alliance 
LLP (94.17%). Records from 2013 
suggest that for a period Vertical 
Alliance LLP also owned a 44.07% 
interest in Mebel JSC, alongside 
Kalorama. This indicates Vertical 
Alliance LLP and the Yakubzhanov 
family held a number of common 
business interests.166
Vertical Alliance LLP is an English 
limited liability partnership, which 
began life under the name Genmark LLP. 
For a period between 2010 and 2014, 
Vertical Alliance LLP and Welroy 
Technology Ltd shared a registered 
address, 8 Shepherd Market London.167 
Rachel Erickson claims this is the 
location from which a large range of 
companies were being fraudulently 
incorporated in her name, without 
permission168. Erickson’s name does not 
appear in Vertical Alliance LLP’s filings.
The first PSC declared by Vertical 
Alliance LLP on 6 April 2016 is Russian 
national Ripsime Ambartsumyan. She 
was replaced in 2019 by her husband 
Russian national, Agadzhan Avanesov 
and his alleged assistant Vakhid 
Artykov.169 Avanesov previously served 
as Chairman of the Board at Russia’s 
Starbank. Russian Central Bank records 
indicate he also held a 19.7% interest 
in Starbank.170 
162 Mebel JSC, Annual Report 2018, Unified Corporate Information Portal, 7 October 2019, available online: http://openinfo.uz/ru/reports/10662/ (accessed 8 
January 2020)
163 Mebel JSC, Annual Report 2018, Unified Corporate Information Portal, 7 October 2019, available online: http://openinfo.uz/ru/reports/10662/ (accessed 8 
January 2020)
164 Mebel JSC, Material Fact Disclosure No.6, Unified Corporate Information Portal, 10 July 2019, available online: www.openinfo.uz/ru/facts/28452/ (accessed 25 
February 2020)
165 Bershariq Tekstil JSC, Company Extract, Reg No.35/2, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 December 2019; Genmark Furniture LLC, 
Company Extract, Reg No.19866, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 December 2019.
166 Mebel JSC, Annual Report 2012, 29 May 2013, available online: biznes-daily.uz/ru/2010-12-09-08-26-52/12872-mbl-qk-oaj (accessed 24 February 2020)
167 See Vertical Alliance LLP, Change of Registered Office Address of a Limited Liability Partnership, Companies House, 23 June 2010, available online: https://
beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC321610/filing-history (accessed 25 February 2020)
168 ‘Owners battle for TV station’, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 24 May 2013, available online: https://www.occrp.org/en/component/
content/article?id=1960:owners-battle-for-tv-station-ru (accessed 19 September 2019); Kagalovsky & Anor v Balmore Invest Ltd & Ors (Rev 1) [2013] EWHC 
3876 (QB) (09 December 2013) 
169 Vertical Alliance LLP, Persons with Significant Control, Companies House, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC321610/
persons-with-significant-control (accessed 10 January 2020)
170 Central Bank of Russia, Entities with Significant Influence or Control over the Credit Institution, 10 June 2015, available online: https://www.cbr.ru/credit/
coinfo.asp?id=710000007 (accessed 8 January 2020)
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Diagram 7: Ownership structure of Starbank documented by the Central Bank of Russia
An investigative report published in 
the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, 
claims Avanesov and his business 
partners were responsible for sending 
the financial institution bankrupt after 
they began loaning out significant 
sums of bank money to companies they 
owned, or shadow-owned.171 These 
loans were not paid back. The loss has 
been estimated at US$200 million. On 
18 March 2016 Starbank’s licence was 
revoked, it was then declared bankrupt 
on 10 August 2016172.
171 Zayakin, A. and Murtazin, I. (2018) ‘How are bankruptcy of a bank in Moscow and a fish factory in St. Petersburg connected with the serene life of Russians 
in Geneva’, Novaya Gazeta, 23 August, available online: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/24/77590-shveytsarskiy-beglets (accessed 24 January 
2020)
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Russia’s Deposit Insurance Agency 
(DIA) now acts as the trustee for 
Starbank. It reports:
During the bankruptcy proceedings 
it was established that the persons 
controlling the Bank took steps to 
form knowingly bad debts of technical 
legal entities (not conducting business 
activities comparable to the extent 
of lending, and not having their own 
property and income that allowed  
them to service loan debt), as well as 
the acquisition of overpriced property. 
In addition … the Bank’s managers did 
not take measures to prevent 
its bankruptcy.173
Eight executives were named in this DIA 
statement, including Avanesov. The DIA 
has initiated legal action to hold the 
named Starbank executives personally 
liable for the bank's debts. A recent 
court report confirms the DIA has 
successfully seized Russian property 
belonging to Avanesov as part of this 
effort.174 
Media reports also indicate Avanesov 
is wanted by Russian authorities for his 
alleged criminal actions.175 Currently, 
Avanesov domiciles in Switzerland, 
where he is reported to own significant 
real-estate and runs a range of 
companies.176 
In addition to holding senior Starbank 
officials personally liable, the DIA has 
initiated legal proceedings against 
debtor companies in a bid to seize 
assets used as collateral for Starbank 
loans. Amudaryotex and Beshariq 
Tekstil are two companies targeted 
in DIA litigation. As noted already, 
the latter is currently part-owned by 
Avanesov through Vertical Alliance LLP, 
while Amudaryotex LLC appears to be 
primarily owned by Avanesov business 
affiliates, the Yakubzhanov family. 
In a decision delivered by the Moscow 
City Arbitration Court on 8 May 2018, it 
was noted that a credit line had been 
agreed between Starbank and Russian 
incorporated company, Amudaryatex 
LLC, in the amount of 5,778,474.80 
euro on 31 July 2013.177 According to the 
courts Russian company, Amudaryatex 
LLC, was established on 5 July 2013, 
shortly before the loan agreement 
was concluded. Movable property 
belonging to Uzbekistani affiliate 
company, Amudaryotex LLC, was 
used as collateral to secure the loan. 
The credit line was drawn down on 
in March 2016, but Amudaryatex LLC 
failed to make repayments. Starbank’s 
license was revoked by the Russian 
Central Bank in the same month. The 
DIA in its statement of claim argued for 
the original loan amount, interest of 
1,500,083.01 euros, and penalty fees in 
the amount of 902,686.47 euros. In total 
this amounts to US$9 million under 
current currency conversion rates. The 
court granted the DIA’s claims. There 
was an appeal. However, the original 
decision was ultimately upheld.  
With respect to the loan involving 
Beshariq Tekstil JSC, the DIA again 
litigated. A decision was handed down 
by the Moscow City Arbitration Court 
on 23 May 2019.178 The case centred on 
a series of loan agreements reached 
with the Russian firm Beshariq Tekstil 
LLC, dated 20 March 2013 (7,749,043.79 
euros), 10 April 2015 (64,467,145.04 
roubles), and the 19 October 2015 
(401,058,346.20 roubles). In total this 
amounts to US$15.5 million, under 
current conversion rates. The first 
loan agreement was secured through 
collateral provided by Uzbekistani 
company Beshariq Tekstil JSC, and 
Russian firm, Vector LLC. The second 
loan agreement was guaranteed 
by Uzbekistani company Beshariq 
Tekstil JSC only. While the third loan 
agreement was guaranteed by the 
Uzbekistani firms Beshariq Tekstil JSC 
and WBM Textile LLC. The latter is a 
subsidiary of Beshariq Tekstil JSC.179 
173 Deposit Insurance Agency, ‘On filing an application on bringing subsidiary liability of controlling Starbank JSC’, 18 March 2019, available online: https://www.
asv.org.ru/liquidation/news/570136/ (accessed 25 February 2020); see also ‘On results of inspection of financial standing of JSC Starbank by provisional 
administration’, Central Bank of Russia, 14 September 2016, available online: https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/PR/?file=15092016_180429eng2016-09-
15T18_03_01.htm (accessed 25 February 2020)
174 ‘Court of Appeal dismisses complaints of ex-StarBank executives about property seizure’, RAPSI, 10 February 2020, available online: rapsinews.ru/judicial_
news/20200210/305445825.html (accessed 27 February 2020)
175 ‘In St. Petersburg, a wanted co-owner of Starbank was spotted. The investigation believed that he lives in Switzerland’, Fontanka, 7 July 2019, available online: 
https://www.fontanka.ru/2019/07/07/015/ (accessed 27 February 2020)
176 Zayakin, A. and Murtazin, I. (2018) ‘How are bankruptcy of a bank in Moscow and a fish factory in St. Petersburg connected with the serene life of Russians in 
Geneva’, Novaya Gazeta, 23 August 2018, available online: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/24/77590-shveytsarskiy-beglets (accessed 24 January 
2020)
177 Moscow City Arbitration Court, Case No A40-228454 / 17-25-1453, Decision, 8 May 2018.
178 Moscow City Arbitration Court, Case No. A40-45399 / 18-25-340, Decision, 23 May 2019.
179 WBM Textile LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.002010-06, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 25 December 2019.
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Beshariq Tekstil LLC stopped making 
repayments in March 2016, shortly 
before Starbank’s license was revoked. 
The Russian courts upheld the DIA’s 
claim. It ordered the public auction of 
Beshariq Tekstil’s assets offered up 
as collateral for the loans. It is unclear 
whether the DIA has been successful 
at enforcing the Russian court orders  
in Uzbekistan.
It appears then that around US$21 
million in loans were made by Starbank 
to Russian concerns, which were 
guaranteed by Uzbekistani companies 
that are currently owned in part or full 
by Starbank’s Chairman and alleged 
shareholder, Agadzhan Avanesov 
(while previously, Avanesov's wife was 
declared the ultimate PSC for Vertical 
Alliance LLP), or business affiliates from 
the Yakubzhanov family. These loans 
were not paid back. The Russian press 
argues this type of arrangement was a 
systemic part of Starbank’s business, 
which led to its bankruptcy and criminal 
investigations into Avanesov. 
Media reports from 2019 state that 
Avanesov remains on a Federal wanted 
list in Russia. It appears that Avanesov 
continues to control his Uzbekistani 
interests from Geneva using a holding 
entity set up and maintained in the UK. 
A Tashkent Stock Exchange announcement 
dated 16 October 2018, claims Beshariq 
Tekstil JSC has been delisted.180 
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov remains 
registered as PSC for a range of notionally 
‘dormant’ UK legal entities, and is the 
principal shareholder in a number of 
Uzbekistani firms (see above). Murat 
Yakubzhanov claims to be the ultimate 
owner of Textile Technologies Limited, 
and Metal Engineering Group. At the 
time of writing, the former Central 
Banker continues to sit on the Board 
of the state owned Uzpromstroybank, 
and is reportedly a partner at Grant 
Thornton Uzbekistan.
Written requests for comment from 
Mirakbar and Murat Yakubzhanov were 
sent respectively to the registered 
offices of Welroy Technology Ltd and 
Grant Thornton Uzbekistan. No reply 
was received. A written request for 
comment was also sent to the Swiss 
address of Agadzhan Avanesov. A reply 
was received on 26 February 2020. 
Additional clarification was received 
on 4 March 2020.
Avanesov denies being wanted by 
Russian authorities. He notes: ‘If I 
was really wanted by the Russian 
authorities, I had to be arrested when 
I crossed a state border. An absence 
of such actions by Russian authorities 
confirms that said announcement was 
baseless and fictitious’.181
Avanesov also claims, ‘Vertical Alliance 
LLP never invested in Uzbekistan’s new 
cotton cluster system. Most probably 
your source of the information is 
inaccurate’.182 A copy of the source, 
Cabinet of Ministers decree No.230 
passed in Tashkent on 18 March 2019, 
was provided to Avanesov. He clarified 
his initial statement on 4 March 2020 
claiming, ‘indeed, local authorities 
(Fergana region’s administration) 
included Beshariqtekstil (being a textile 
factory of Beshariq district of Fergana 
region) in the governmental resolution 
referred by you. But this cotton cluster 
has not been realized’.183
Avanesov also denies any impropriety 
alleged against him by the DIA and 
the Novaya Gazeta investigation. Mr 
Avanesov claims ‘I have never been the 
largest single shareholder of Starbank. 
I have only been a representative of  
the one of the minor shareholders 
of Starbank’. 
This conflicts with 2015 filings available 
from the Central Bank of Russia which 
identify Mr Avanesov as the joint largest 
shareholder in Starbank through a Swiss 
holding vehicle Cage Holding SA.184 
Other major shareholders include 
Viktor Hambardzumyan (19.7%) and 
Nargiza Artykova (19.6%). 
Avanesov also asserts that ‘since 2017 
Uzbek textile factory Beshariqtextile 
has no branches in Russia. Accordingly 
I cannot comment [on] a decision of 
Moscow city Arbitration court of 2019 
in regards to activity of third party’. 
Russian court records show, however, 
that the DIA’s Moscow City Arbitration 
Court action includes Beshariq Tekstil 
JSC in Uzbekistan. Vertical Alliance LLP 
remains the majority shareholder in 
Beshariq Tekstil JSC. 
Turning to Starbank, it is claimed by 
Avanesov, ‘no owned by me companies 
were awarded loans from Starbank. I do 
not know from where and how Novaya 
Gazeta got this inaccurate information’. 
180 ‘On the exclusion of securities (delisting) of a number of joint-stock companies from the stock quotation list of the RSE “Toshkent”’, Tashkent Republic Stock 
Exchange, 16 October 2018, available online: https://uzse.uz/boards/609 (accessed 27 February 2020)
181 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 4 March 2020.
182 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 26 February 2020.
183 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 4 March 2020.
184 Central Bank of Russia, Entities with Significant Influence or Control over the Credit Institution, 10 June 2015, available online: https://www.cbr.ru/credit/
coinfo.asp?id=710000007 (accessed 8 January 2020)
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In the instance of Beshariq Tekstil JSC, 
when the Starbank loan was defaulted 
on by its Russian affiliate, the guarantor 
Uzbekistani JSC was majority owned by 
Vertical Alliance LLP.185 Vertical Alliance 
LLP initially declared one beneficial owner 
on 6 April 2016, Ripsime Ambartsumyan, 
the reported wife of Avanesov.186 This 
PSC declaration was updated on 11 
March 2019. Ms Ambartsumyan was 
removed from the PSC register, while 
Mr Vakhid Artykov and Mr Agadzhan 
Avanesov were both declared beneficial 
owners of Vertical Alliance LLP.
Avanesov claims no knowledge of 
subsequent actions taken by Russian 
authorities following Starbank’s 
bankruptcy: ‘After revocation of banking 
license, Starbank was a subject to 
investigation of the competent 
authorities of Russian Federation. 
Not being a participant of this 
investigation, I do not know its  
state and I cannot comment it’.187 In 
subsequent correspondence, Avanesov 
acknowledges recently appealing 
against a court decision approving the 
seizure of his Moscow property. The 
appeal was unsuccessful.188 Avanesov 
claims the seizure of his property is 
a ‘provisional measure’ and will only 
become final ‘if my guilt for bankruptcy 
of the bank will be proved’.189
185 Beshariq Tekstil, Material Fact Number.36, no date, Tashkent Stock Exchange, available online: https://www.uzse.uz/reports/3728/material_fact?locale=en 
(accessed 10 March 2020)
186 Vertical Alliance LLP, Persons with Significant Control, Companies House, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC321610/
persons-with-significant-control (accessed 10 March 2020)
187 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 26 February 2020.
188 ‘Court of Appeal dismisses complaints of ex-StarBank executives about property seizure’, RAPSI, 10 February 2020, available online: www.rapsinews.ru/
judicial_news/20200210/305445825.html (accessed 12 March 2020)
189 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 4 March 2020.
190 Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 26 February 2020.
THE TIES BETWEEN AVANESOV AND THE YAKUBZHANOV FAMILY WERE 
ACKNOWLEDGED. HOWEVER, AVANESOV INDICATES THIS RELATIONSHIP HAS 
ENDED ACRIMONIOUSLY: 
I know Mr Murat Yakubzhanov, who is currently named Murat Yakubov. I had a 
court dispute against the father of Mr Murat Yakubzhanov (Yakubov) in Geneva, 
Switzerland. Mr Murat Yakubzhanov (Yakubov) attended in the court hearings 
as a witness. In accordance with the decision of the Tribunal of the first instance 
of Geneva dated 11 September 2018 (case number JTPI/13634/2018), which was 
confirmed by Swiss Federal Court on 14 November 2019, Mr Murat Yakubzhanov’s 
father was condemned to pay to me, as of today, in total 1 330 000 US$. Mr Murat 
Yakubzhanov (Yakubov) and his father completely ignore to pay a judged debt 
and thus they demonstrate their relation to Swiss justice at all. In addition, in 
accordance with the Penal ruling (ordonnance) of Public Ministry of Geneva dated 
5 July 2019 (case number P/14513/2016), which was confirmed after opposition on  
30 January 2019 [sic] by Public Ministry of Geneva, Mr Murat Yakubzhanov 
(Yakubov)’s father was declared guilty for defamation and calumny against me and 
Mr Vakhid Artykov. As well as Public Ministry of Geneva suspended the sentence 
and set the probationary period at 3 years. At present, Public Ministry of Geneva 
has filed the case to Penal court for pronouncement of the sentence.190
Redacted court documents and 
government directives appear to support 
these claims.191 The US$1.33 million 
award relates to a disputed sales 
and purchase agreement for shares 
in a British company, name redacted, 
owned by a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, name 
redacted. The British company had an 
Uzbekistani subsidiary. The proposed 
purchaser of the British company was  
a Luxembourg entity. The purchase 
price was US$14 million. 
The sale and purchase agreement 
was premised on a stipulation, that 
the Uzbekistani subsidiary finalise 
government approval to acquire a 
cotton-yarn factory in the autonomous 
republic of Karakalpakstan, which 
was being acquired at zero cost.  
A US$1 million deposit was paid for 
the share purchase. The government 
approval was not evidently obtained 
within the contractually stipulated 
date. As a result, the contract was 
rescinded. The Swiss court awarded 
the return of the initial deposit 
with interest and costs. The court 
discounted evidence presented by 
the defendant relating to ‘fraudulent 
payments’ in Russia allegedly made  
by the plaintiff, concluding it was  
not relevant to the Swiss case. 
In addition it appears from a Swiss 
Criminal Order dated 5 July 2019, 
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov was found guilty 
of defamation and libel. He was ordered 
to pay a fine and was given a suspended 
sentence of 3 years.192
Despite the Swiss court actions, 
Mirakbar Yakubzhanov, and allegedly 
Murat Yakubzhanov, retain a minority 
shareholding in Beshariq Tekstil JSC.
Given that the information collated 
in this section is primarily based off 
publicly available corporate filings, 
court proceedings and media reporting, 
several conclusions can be reached 
with regards to how companies such 
as, Amudaryotex, and Beshariq Tekstil, 
were selected to operate cotton clusters. 
Either, the Government of Uzbekistan 
failed to conduct proper due diligence 
on the corporate operators it has 
selected, or it conducted due diligence 
and was prepared to appoint companies 
that have been directly implicated in a 
foreign bank scandal. 
When the Government of Uzbekistan 
has been questioned previously about 
accepting investors exhibiting serious 
red flags, the First Deputy Minister of 
Economy and Industry has stated they 
must be pragmatic.193 It would appear 
then either ‘pragmatism’, or a failure 
to conduct due diligence, has enabled 
two companies directly tied to the 
Starbank scandal to potentially benefit 
from the cluster system. 
191 Federal Tribunal, Switzerland, First Civil Law 
Court, Case No.4A_271/2019, 14 November 2019. 
192 Canton of Geneva, Public Prosecutor, Criminal 
Order, P/145513/2016, 5 July 2019.
193 ‘“It doesn’t matter when the company is 
created” - hokim about Tashkent City investors’, 
Gazeta, 31 January 2019, available online: 
https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/01/31/
investors/ (accessed 20 January 2020)
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VPART V FURTHER CLUSTERS AND RED FLAGS
The previous two sections evidenced some of the problematic transactions and 
business practices which stand behind companies exhibiting red flags. Part V 
presents further instances where cluster operators exhibited a significant 
number of red flags. It cannot be inferred on the basis of these red flags that 
the operators are involved in improper or illegal activity. The corporate traits 
documented here do, however, as a totality elevate the risk of abusive 
practices occurring at points in the cluster system.
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194 On Measures to Introduce Modern Forms of Organizing Cotton-Textile Production, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.53, 25 January 
2018, available online: www.lex.uz/ru/docs/3527483 (accessed 11 October 2019)
195 Surxon Teks LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.513924, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019.
196 Sherobod Textile Invest LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.25286, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019.
197 Nortex Style LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.66, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019.
198 On Additional Measures for the Further Development of Cotton and Textile Industries, Decree, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.744, 19 
September 2018, available online: https://www.lex.uz/docs/3906242?ONDATE=22.09.2018%2000#3915390 (accessed 2 February 2020)
199 See, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL010457/filing-history
200 ‘UNDP entries to the UN ineligibility list’, UNDP, available online: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/procurement/business/protest-
and-sanctions/ineligibility-list/ (accessed 28 January 2020)
201 See written question 105316 to the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 14 September 2017, available online: https://www.parliament.uk/
business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2017-09-14/105316/ (accessed 28 February 2020)
The key offshore entity cross-cutting 
these clusters is Nortex Corporation 
LP. It is not a ‘corporation’, as the 
name implies, it is a Scottish Limited 
Partnership. Some of the added 
governance risks associated with this 
legal form were set out in Part II. 
Nortex Corporation LP filings with 
Companies House in the UK, are signed 
by Matthew Bradley on behalf of the 
limited, and general partner.199 Bradley 
has been blacklisted by the United 
Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) for fraud, fraud and collusion, 
and fraud and obstruction.200   
At the time of writing Nortex 
Corporation LP has also failed to take 
reasonable steps under PSC (persons 
with significant control) rules to find 
out whether there is anyone who is 
a registrable person or a registrable 
legality entity. Failure to comply with 
the Scottish Partnerships (Register 
of People with Significant Control) 
Regulation 2017 is an indictable offence, 
with a maximum sentence of two years 
prison. However, the UK government 
has stated compliance, rather than 
prosecution, is its primary aim.201
Sherobod Textile Invest LLC and Surxon Teks LLC were 
appointed on 25 January 2018 to operate a 11,810 hectare 
cluster.194 Surxon Teks’ ultimate, majority shareholder is Nortex 
Corporation LP.195 Shares in Sherobod Textile Invest are majority 
owned by the state enterprise, National Bank of Uzbekistan 
(59.2%).196 The remaining 40.8% of shares belong to Nortex 
Style. Nortex Style is a fully owned subsidiary of Nortex 
Corporation LP.197 Nortex Style was awarded an additional  
8,742 hectare cluster in the Kumkurgan district of the 
Surkhandarya region on 19 September 2018.198
SURKHANDARYA REGION, 
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A group by the name of South Development Holding claims both Sherobod Textile 
Invest and Surxonteks LLC, are a part of its group structure. South Development 
Holding’s website states that it is ‘a diversified southeast holding company with 
significant interests in banking, textile, construction and network of business 
centers’.202 The group claims to be owned by Abdukodir Norbekov and ‘his partners’. 
No information is provided on the identity of these partners. 
Other companies claimed by South Development Holding include Nortex Style, 
Amudar Textile, Tela Textile, Janub Fayz Teks, Surkhon Shifer, Surkhon Sandwich, 
and Silver Style. The ownership structure of these companies, in December 2019, 
are set out in table ten. 
202 ‘About’, South Development Holding, available online: sdh.uz/en/o-holdinge/ (accessed 28 February 2020) 
203 Janub Fayz Teks LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.2070, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 25 October 2019; Amudar Textile LLC, Company 
Extract, Reg No.1559, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019; Tela Textile LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.7553, Unified Portal 
of Interactive Public Services, accessed 25 October 2019;  Surkhon Shifer LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.89, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, 
accessed 31 December 2019; Surkhon Sandwich LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.3000, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019; 
Sherobod Textile Invest LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.25286, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019; Nortex Style LLC, 
Company Extract, Reg No.66, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019; Surxon Teks LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.513924, 
Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 31 December 2019.
Table 10: Share ownership profile of companies reported to be in the South Development Holding group.203
Janub Fayz Teks Ergashev Ulug’bek Abdikakhorovich* (100%)
* Listed as General Manager of Amudar Textile
Amudar Textile Atlanta Corporation LP (74.88%)
Norbekov Abdiqodir Suyunovich (12.25%)
Tela Textile Jumayex Sardor Jo’rayevich (21.53%), Islamov Bakhodir Bukramovich (0.98%), 
Khalikov Khasan Khudjayarovich (77.49%)
Surkhon Shifer Rustam Sherzod Fayz (72.87%) [Abdullayev Qarshi (100%)], Alikulov Tokhir 
Allanazarovich (27.13%)
Surkhon Sandwich Raupov Bakhrom Qayumovich (49%), Norbekov Abduqodir Suyunovich (51%)
Sherobod Textile Invest Nortex Style (40.8%) and NBU Invest Group (59.20%)
Nortex Style Nortex Corporation LP
Silver Style Unknown
Surxon Teks Umarov Maxmud Fayzullayevich (10.21%), Nortex Style (78.9%)
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UK filings with Companies House for 
Atlanta Corporation LP, majority owner 
of Amudar Textile, are also signed by 
Matthew Bradley, on behalf of the 
limited and general partner.204 Atlanta 
Corporation has declared one PSC on  
30 December 2019, Abdukodir 
Norbekov.205 This declaration is based 
on beneficial ownership. Abdukodir 
Norbekov is also listed as a PSC of 
Shipmark LLP for 1 day in 2016.206 
Norbekov is then replaced by Ivan Pak 
on the basis of significant control.  
Pak is listed on Uzbekistani corporate 
filings as a manager for Nortex Style 
and Tela Textile. 
Unlike Scottish LPs, English LLPs must 
submit annual accounts to Companies 
House. Shipmark LLP filings are signed 
by Ali Moulaye and Dong-Hee Kang 
(see Part III). The company’s principal 
listed activity is trade agent for which 
it has received commissions of £7000 
(2014), £2741 (2015), £25,025 (2016), 
and £7,650 (2017).207 The company was 
then dissolved on 26 March 2019 by 
compulsory strike off.
On 4 April 2017, South Development 
Holding claims it acquired Hi-Tech Bank.208 
Hi-Tech Bank has been appointed by the 
Government of Uzbekistan to service 
the Sherobod district cotton cluster.
Audit reports indicate that companies 
associated with the South Development 
Holding group have held a significant 
stake in the bank.209 Furthermore, filings 
from the period suggest the bank board 
consisted primarily of representatives 
from group companies, with the exception 
of Ilhomjon Omonov, a General Manager 
at Genmark Furniture, a firm referenced 
in Part IV.210 Filings from July 2019 indicate 
the board has changed composition. 
South Developing Holding company 
managers no longer appear on the 
board. They have been replaced by 
representatives from companies 
outside the group.211
There is no record of a South 
Development Holding on Uzbekistan’s 
VAT register. An additional search of 
Open Corporates returned no results. 
A request for information sent to 
South Development Holding was not 
responded to.
In a Cabinet of Ministers decree dated 
18 March 2019, Sherobod Textile Invest, 
Surxon Teks and Nortex Style clusters 
were cancelled (no substantive 
explanation for the government’s 
decision could be located on the public 
record).212 This is during the same 
period in which representatives from 
the company were removed from the 
board at Hi-Tech Bank. There are no 
announcements on the company’s 
website since September 2018. The last 
social media posting on Facebook is 
dated 21 April 2017.
The use of an anonymous offshore 
company, the apparent failure to 
observe PSC regulations, and the 
involvement of a manager in Nortex 
Corporation LP dealings implicated 
in fraud, all constitute red flags. 
The lack of clarity around beneficial 
ownership, and Sherobod Textile Invest 
LLC and Surxon Teks LLC apparent 
inclusion in the corporate structure of 
South Development Holdings, raises 
additional concerns, as does the sudden 
cessation of the company’s involvement 
in the cluster system.  
204 The relevant filings can be accessed here: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL007493/filing-history 
205 Atlanta Corporation LP, Persons with Significant Control, Companies House, 9 December 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/SL007493/persons-with-significant-control (accessed 28 February 2020)
206 Shipmark LLP, Persons with Significant Control, Companies House, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC388683/persons-with-
significant-control  (accessed 28 February 2020)
207 See filing history: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC388683/filing-history
208 South Development Holding, Facebook Post, 4 April 2017, available online: https://www.facebook.com/pg/southdevelopmentholdinguz/posts/ (accessed 28 
February 2020)
209 PKF Mak Alyans Auditorlik (2018) Hi-Tech Bank Financial Statements According to International Standards for Financial Reporting for the Year Ended 31 
December 2017, www.openinfo.uz/media/audit_conclusion/Аудиторский_отчет_HI-TECHBANK_за_2017_год.pdf (accessed 28 February 2020)  
210 Hi-Tech Bank, Material Fact Notification No.8, 16 August 2017, available online: htb.uz/storage/app/public/default/08_16.08.2017.pdf (accessed 1 January 
2020)
211 Hi-Tech Bank, Material Fact No. 8, 2 July 2019, available online: https://htb.uz/storage/app/public/Facts/36e5876fbf84afab03aac3b5db450971.pdf 
(accessed 1 January 2020)
212 On Measures for the Further Development of Cotton and Textile Industries, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Decree, No.230, 18 March 2019, 
available online: https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4245407 (accessed 28 February 2020)
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During 2019 Vitcom Textiles Limited 
reported one Director, the Belizean 
based, Matthew Bradley. This is the 
same individual acting for Nortex 
Corporation LP. Bradley has been 
blacklisted by the UNDP for fraud, 
fraud and obstruction, and fraud and 
collusion. He has also acted as the legal 
owner of Vitcom’s shares.215 However, 
under UK company law reforms, where 
a shareholder is a nominee, beneficial 
owners must be declared if they have a 
25% or greater stake in the company. 
Vitcom Textiles Limited has declared 
one person with significant control, 
Ulugbek Ergashev, an Uzbekistani 
citizen whose correspondence address 
is St. Nicholas Close in Elstree, United 
Kingdom.216 In a LinkedIn profile 
Ergashev is listed as the founder of the 
Anteks group, a textile conglomerate 
in Uzbekistan. The group employs an 
offshore structure in the UK centring on 
Vitcom Textile Limited. Corporate filings 
in Uzbekistan, checked during 2019, 
indicate Ergashev’s full name  
is Ergashev Ulugbek Oripovich.
213 Digital Prime Textile LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.194, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 22 January 2019.
214 ‘List of investment projects with FDIs by regions in Uzbekistan (2018)’, Consulate General of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Frankfurt, available online: https://
www.gk-usbekistan.de/ru/инвестпроекты-в-узбекистане/ (accessed 28 February 2020)
215 Vitcom Textiles Limited, Annual Return 2014, Companies House, 27 April 2015, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08034432/
filing-history (accessed 28 October 2019)
216 Vitcom Textiles Limited, Persons with Significant Control, Companies House, 8 June 2018, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/08034432/persons-with-significant-control (accessed 30 October 2019)
The company selected to operate the 10,400 hectare Balikchi 
district cluster in Andijan is Digital Prime Textile LLC. 
Digital Prime Textile LLC shares are fully owned by Vitcom 
Textile Limited, a UK company incorporated on 17 April 2012.213 
According to Uzbekistani government foreign direct 
investment reporting, Vitcom Textiles Limited is channelling 
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Table 11: Ownership profile of the Anteks Group during 2019217
Group Member Shareholders Ultimate Shareholders and/or PSCs
Digital Prime Textile Vitcom Textile Limited (100%) Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (100%)
Magnus Textile Vitcom Textile Limited (100%) Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (100%)
Global Orient Textile Vitcom Textile Limited (100%) Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (100%)
Skorton Textile Vitcom Textiles (77.69%) and Trust Rest Servis 
(22.31%)
Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (77.79%), 
Oripov Umidbek Ulug’bek (12.56%) and Oripova 
Dilnozaxon Ulug’bek (9.74%)
Inter Global Tekstil Vitcom Textile Limited (100%) Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (100%)
Elite Group Tekstil Vitcom Textile Limited (77.04%) and Trust Rest 
Servis (22.96%)
Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (77.04%), 
Oripov Umidbek Ulug’bek (12.93%) and Oripova 
Dilnozaxon Ulug’bek (10.03%)
Fan Tekstil Vitcom Tekstil (36.50%) and Skorton Tekstil 
(63.50%)
Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (85.83%), 
Oripov Umidbek Ulug’bek (8.21%) and Oripova 
Dilnozaxon Ulug’bek (6.36%)
Anteks Group Skorton Textile (100%) Matthew Bradley/Ulugbek Ergashev (77.79%), 
Oripov Umidbek Ulug’bek (12.56%) and Oripova 
Dilnozaxon Ulug’bek (9.74%)
Trust Rest Servis
Oripov Umidbek Ulug’bek (56.33%) and 
Oripova Dilnozaxon Ulug’bek (43.67%)
Shaxrixon-Avto Ravon Vitcom Textiles Limited (20%+)
Oripov Umidbek Ulugbek (20%+)
217 Magnus Tekstil LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.3128, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Global Orient Tekstil LLC, 
Company Extract, Reg No.7404, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Skorton Tekstil LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.22, 
Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Inter Global Tekstil LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.195, Unified Portal of Interactive 
Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Elite Group Tekstil LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.193, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 
18 September 2019; Fan Tekstil LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.3127, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Anteks Group 
LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.2148, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Trust Rest Servis LLC, Company Extract, Reg 
No. 002048-11, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 18 September 2019; Shaxrixon-Avto Ravon JSC, Annual Report 2018, Unified Corporate 
Information Portal, 25 June 2019, available online: https://openinfo.uz/ru/reports/10477/ (accessed 28 October 2019).
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According to the 2019 annual accounts 
Vitcom Textile Limited filed with 
Companies House it had an operating 
loss of US$21,337.218 As a result the 
company paid no UK corporations tax. 
The 2019 annual accounts list Vitcom 
Textiles Limited’s overseas share 
holdings. It notes one overseas interest, 
in the Russian firm Vitcom Textile LLC. 
On the other hand, Vitcom’s 2018 and 
2017 annual accounts declare shares 
held in Magnus Tektil, a company 
based in Uzbekistan.219 These filings 
appear to conflict with records kept 
in Uzbekistan’s unified register of 
legal entities, where Vitcom Textile 
Limited is the majority owner of seven 
companies. Were Vitcom Textiles 
Limited to knowingly or recklessly 
submit misleading, false or deceptive 
information to the UK corporate 
registry, it would be an offence under 
s.1112 of the Companies Act 2006. 
There is an additional, notable interest 
held by Vitcom Textile Limited in 
Uzbekistan. Joint stock company 
records filed with the Tashkent Stock 
Exchange indicate that the Anteks 
Group had a significant interest in 
Andijan car dealership Shaxrixon-Avto 
Ravon during the 2017-19 period.220 The 
Andijan dealership held contracts to 
distribute General Motor vehicles. This 
contractual arrangement was publicly 
cancelled in September 2018. In a media 
release issued by General Motors it was 
stated that this decision was a result 
of corruption, fraud, mismanagement, 
and a lack of transparency within 
Shaxrixon-Avto Ravon.221
The Balikchi district cluster has come 
under criticism from farmers. Thirty 
farmers claim they did not receive 
payment for the 2019 cotton harvest.  
In an interview with Radio Ozodlik, 
farmer Munojat Khamdamova said 
that a group of farmers travelled to 
Tashkent in January 2020.222 They 
reported to the Ministry of Agriculture 
that the cluster operator had allegedly 
failed to make required payments to 
farmers. The Ministry promised to 
solve the problem. As of 25 February 
2020, there has been no change to 
the situation. A representative of the 
cluster informed Radio Ozodlik that he 
does not know when the cluster will be 
able to make the payments.
Unlike the previous example, Digital 
Prime Textile is owned by a lower risk 
offshore legal entity. However, this 
is counterweighed by a director and 
shareholder tied by the UNDP to fraud, 
potential discrepancies in the accounts 
filed with Companies House by Vitcom 
Textile Limited, complaints lodged 
with the Ministry of Agriculture by 
farmers, and the allegations made by 
General Motors tying Anteks Group to 
corruption, fraud and mismanagement. 
Together these factors constitute a 
serious set of red flags. 
218 Vitcom Textiles Limited, Report of the Director and Unaudited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 30th April 2019 for Vitcom Textiles Limited, Companies 
House, 18 September 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08034432/filing-history (accessed 28 October 2019)
219 Vitcom Textiles Limited, Report of the Director and Unaudited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 30th April 2018 for Vitcom Textiles Limited, Companies 
House, 30 October 2018, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08034432/filing-history (accessed 28 October 2019); Vitcom 
Textiles Limited, Report of the Director and Unaudited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 30th April 2017 for Vitcom Textiles Limited, Companies House, 7 
July 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08034432/filing-history (accessed 28 October 2019)
220 Shaxrixon-Avto Ravon, Material Fact No.36, Single Portal of Corporate Information, 4 August 2017, available online: https://openinfo.uz/en/facts/9562/ 
(accessed 30 October 2019)
221 ‘GM Uzbekistan terminates dealership agreement with Shaxrixon-Avto Ravon’, GM Uzbekistan, 29 September 2018, available online: https://uzautomotors.
com/articles/gmuzbekistan_shahrixon_avto_ravon_bilan_dilerlikni_bekor_qildi (accessed 28 October 2019)
222 ‘At least 30 farms from one district in Andijan region did not receive cotton money from the cluster’, Radio Ozodlik, 25 February 2020, available online: https://
www.ozodlik.org/a/klaster-paxta-pul-yoq/30453336.html (accessed 28 February 2020)
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No record could be found for Bukhara 
Cotton Textile Cluster Agrokompleks 
in Uzbekistan’s VAT register. There is 
a listing for the company, BCT Cluster 
Agrokompleks.224 Its shares, in turn, are 
held by the company Bukhara Cotton 
Textile Cluster. There is no VAT record 
for a company by this name. The closest 
match is a company Bukhara Cotton 
Textile.225 Its major shareholder is 
Paraglide Limited (85%). An academic 
article by senior executives involved in 
the cotton cluster confirm it ‘is formed 
through investment in the amount of 
123,1 million US$ by “Bukhara Cotton 
Textile” British-Uzbekistan JV, 
“Paraglide LTD” JV and “Petromaruz” 
(Russia)’.226 In other reporting Petromaruz 
is described as a British investor.227
The same joint-venture partners have 
been appointed to operate the Kuychirchik 
district cluster in Tashkent. This particular 
cluster was set up through a bespoke 
Cabinet of Ministers decree passed on 
1 December 2018.228 The decree grants 
the joint venture partners significant 
acreage of land, as well as infrastructure 
at zero cost. It also grants the joint 
venture custom and other exemptions, 
in addition to loan capital and credit 
lines. The state aid solicited through 
this decree was granted on the basis of 
a proposal jointly authored by a range 
of government agencies. No evidence 
could be identified to suggest this 
cluster operator was appointed through 
an open, transparent and competitive 
selection mechanism. 
It is claimed by farmers in the Kuychirchik 
district that their land has been improperly 
confiscated by the government 
to make way for this cluster.229
In total, across the two clusters,  
the joint venture partners on paper  
are marshalling US$340.7 million. 
223 Rahmatov, M.A., Rakhimov, F.X., Zaripov, B.Z., Kudratov, T.U., Dusmuxamedova, M.H, Niyazmetov, B. A. and Joroqulov, S. (2018), ‘Cotton-textile cluster as a 
knowledge base for education, science and manufacturing innovational cooperation’, International Journal of Agriculture and Forestry, 8(3), 124-128, available 
online: article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.ijaf.20180803.02.html (accessed 28 February 2020)
224 BCT Cluster Agrokompleks LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.528900, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 19 September 2019.
225 Bukhara Cotton Textile LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.16197, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 11 July 2019.
226 Rahmatov, M.A., Rakhimov, F.X., Zaripov, B.Z., Kudratov, T.U., Dusmuxamedova, M.H, Niyazmetov, B. A. and Joroqulov, S. (2018), ‘Cotton-textile cluster as a 
knowledge base for education, science and manufacturing innovational cooperation’, International Journal of Agriculture and Forestry, 8(3), 124-128, available 
online: article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.ijaf.20180803.02.html (accessed 28 February 2020)
227 ‘British Petromaruz Group of Companies has invested $15 billion to promote innovation in Uzbekistan’, Xalq so'zi, 3 July 2019, available online: xs.uz/uzkr/post/
britaniyaning-petromaruz-kompaniyalar-guruhi-ozbekistonda-bazi-sohalarni-rivozhlantirish-uchun-15-mlrd-som-azhratadi (accessed 28 February 2020)
228 On Measures to Create a Modern Agro-Industrial Cluster in the Kuychirchik District of the Tashkent Region, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
Decree, No.974, 1 December 2018, available online: https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4089949 (accessed 29 February 2020); 
229 ‘Farmers' land transferred to privately-owned cluster’, El-Tuz, 22 May 2019, available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycodClogCmY  (accessed 21 
February 2020); ‘Cotton clusters and the despair of Uzbek farmers: Land confiscations, blank contracts and failed payments’, Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, 
2 April 2020, available online: https://www.uzbekforum.org/cotton-clusters-and-the-despair-of-uzbek-farmers-land-confiscations-blank-contracts-and-
failed-payments/ (accessed 4 April 2020)
The company selected to operate the Romitan district 
cluster is Bukhara Cotton Textile Cluster Agrokompleks 
(BCT cluster). The details of this cluster are set out in 
a Cabinet of Ministers decree dated 25 January 2019. It 
appears, however, the cluster was potentially established 
by a bespoke decree issued on 19 May 2017.223 This decree 
has not been published on Uzbekistan’s national database 
of legislation. 
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Diagram 9: Diagram of BCT Cluster management structure published in a paper co-authored by Petromaruz managers230
230 Rahmatov, M.A., Rakhimov, F.X., Zaripov, B.Z., Kudratov, T.U., Dusmuxamedova, M.H, Niyazmetov, B. A. and Joroqulov, S. (2018), ‘Cotton-textile cluster as a 
knowledge base for education, science and manufacturing innovational cooperation’, International Journal of Agriculture and Forestry, 8(3), 124-128, available 
online: article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.ijaf.20180803.02.html (accessed 28 February 2020)
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The first of the joint venture partners, 
and the ‘primary coordinator’ of the BCT 
cluster project, Paraglide Limited, is a 
limited liability company incorporated 
in England on 7 September 2012.231 Its 
address is 71 Queen Victoria Street, 
London. It has three Directors, Jerzy 
Miroslaw Gawrysiak, Stephen John 
Goldsmith, and Muzaffar Rakhmatov. 
The company has declared no persons 
with significant control. Its last 
confirmation statement declares that 
the sole shareholder is Ilion Nominees 
Ltd.232 Its assets include debtors 
(US$1,410,894) and $284 cash.233 No 
other assets are declared. However, it 
does note subsequent to the financial 
year being reported on, Paraglide 
Limited acquired a controlling interest 
in five trading entities in Uzbekistan for 
US$20,150,000
Two of the three Directors – Gawrysiak 
and Rakhmatov – are on the board 
of another UK incorporated entity, 
Company Petromaruz Limited. It shares 
a registered address with Paraglide 
Limited. Company Petromaruz 
Limited declares no person with 
significant control.234 The certificate 
of incorporation lists one shareholder 
Aeroton Enterprise Corp, which 
is registered in the British Virgin 
Islands.235 Now shares in Company 
Petromaruz Limited are held by Ilion 
Secretaries Ltd. According to the 
most recent accounts, signed by Jerzy 
Gawrysiak, Company Petromaruz has 
net assets of -£931.236 On the other 
hand, the unified register of legal 
entities in Uzbekistan indicates that 
Company Petromaruz Limited owns a 
55% shareholding in the oil producer 
Jarkurgonneftqaytaishlash, alongside 
Jarqo’rg’onneft (45%).237 
A third entity at this registered address 
71 Queen Victoria Street is Petromaruz 
Overseas LLP.238 Its limited and general 
partner are both incorporated in the 
British Virgin Islands. Petromaruz 
Overseas LLP declares having no person 
with significant control. Its annual 
accounts state that the limited liability 
partnership is actively involved in 
Uzbekistan’s petrochemical industry 
with 510 employees. The website for 
Petromaruz Overseas contains no 
information on its management 
or owners. 
231 Paraglide Limited’s corporate profile and filings are available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08205603
232 Paraglide Limited, Confirmation Statement, Companies House, 23 October 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08205603/
filing-history (accessed 29 February 2020)
233 Paraglide Limited, Unaudited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2018, Companies House, 25 September 2019, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08205603/filing-history (accessed 29 February 2020)
234 Company Petromaruz Limited, Persons with Significant Control, Companies House, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/11317999/
persons-with-significant-control (accessed 29 February 2020)
235 Company Petromaruz Limited, Certification of Incorporation of a Private Limited Company, Companies House, 19 April 2018, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/11317999/filing-history (accessed 29 February 2020)
236 Company Petromaruz Limited, Micro-Entity Accounts 31 December 2018, Companies House, 27 September 2019, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/11317999/filing-history (Accessed 29 February 2020)
237 Jarkurgonneftqaytaishlash LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.1904, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 December 2019
238 Petromaruz Overseas LLP, Financial Statements for the Year ended 31 December 2018, Companies House, 30 September 2019, available online: https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC380603/filing-history (accessed 29 February 2020)
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There is also a locally registered 
company in Uzbekistan by the name 
of Petromaruzgaz. Its largest single 
shareholder is Mustafo Rakhmatov 
(30.6%), the next largest shareholder  
is Mustaqim Rakhmatov (25%).239  
The Chairman of the Petromaruz 
group has been identified in the media 
as Murtazo Rakhmatov.240 Murtazo 
Rakhmatov is a Senator in the Oliy 
Majlis, and a member of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.241  
He is also reported to be the head  
of the Kuychirchik district cluster  
in Tashkent.242
BCT cluster has been the subject of 
a Radio Ozodlik investigation. BCT 
employees claim that they are only 
being paid half the salary stipulated 
in their contracts. Workers maintain 
that they are being forced to work 
longer hours than agreed to. Safety 
procedures are reportedly routinely 
breached. Employees claim BCT’s 
management consists of former 
security service officials. It is also 
alleged management abuse and  
bully staff.243 
The opaque structure of the company, 
the active use of secrecy havens, the 
involvement of a politically exposed 
person, and the direct involvement 
of the local hokimiyat in a joint 
management structure, are all red 
flags warranting closer scrutiny. Media 
reporting on potential violations of 
labour rights further exacerbates the 
risk profile of this cluster operator.
A request for further information was 
sent to BCT Cluster Agrokompleks’ 
registered email address on 11 December 
2019, the email was returned as 
undeliverable.
239 Petromaruzgaz LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.145, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 December 2019.
240 ‘For the first time in Uzbekistan, the private sector has invested in science projects’, Gazeta, 2 July 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/uz/2019/07/02/sarmoya/ 
(accessed 29 February 2020)
241 ‘Are agricultural clusters the next monopoly? The senator reacted’, Daryo-Uz, 4 March 2020, available online: daryo-uz.com/crp/
KislokhujaligiklasterlarinavbatdagimonopoliamiSenatormunosabatbildirdi_crp/ (accessed 5 May 2020); ‘UzLiDeP activist patronizes over 1000 families’, 
UzLiDeP, 2 May 2020, available online: www.uzlidep.uz/en/news-of-party/6359 (accessed 10 May 2020)
242 ‘Are agricultural clusters the next monopoly? The senator reacted’, Daryo-Uz, 4 March 2020, available online: daryo-uz.com/crp/
KislokhujaligiklasterlarinavbatdagimonopoliamiSenatormunosabatbildirdi_crp/ (accessed 5 May 2020)
243 Sadridden, A. (2019), ‘Installers of Bukhara Cotton Textile are unhappy with the fact that their salaries are half-paid’, Radio Ozodlik, 7 February 2019, available 
online: https://www.ozodlik.org/a/29757458.html (accessed 29 February 2020)
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In contrast to other clusters, under this 
Presidential decree a bespoke Working 
Commission has been set up to provide 
the project with ‘comprehensive 
assistance’. It is chaired by the Deputy 
Prime Minister and is staffed by Ministers 
and senior civil servants. The decree also 
grants tax and customs exemptions 
until 1 January 2022, including corporate 
tax. The hokimiyat of Jizzakh is charged 
with selecting farms to work with 
the cluster, and providing practical 
assistance to conclude contracts.
The BMB Trade Group describes itself 
as a young investment and consulting 
company.245 This corresponds with its 
date of incorporation in Uzbekistan,  
13 April 2017.246 BMB Trade Group claim 
to be spearheading projects valued at 
US$500 million. 
The largest current shareholder is Aziz 
Mamatkulov (40%).247 Chairman of the 
company is Bekzod Mamatkulov.248 The 
Advisor to the Chairman of the Board is 
Tursunali Kuziev. Kuziev was Minister 
for Cultures and Sports from 2011-2013. 
According to Radio Ozodlik Kuziev was 
removed from his post for ‘financial 
embezzlement’.249 The media agency 
reports ‘former Minister Tursunali 
Kuziev escaped a prison sentence with 
the condition that he cover the material 
damage caused to the state’.
BMB’s CEO is Makhmud Asamov. His 
resume includes a number of notable 
political posts. First, Asamov was Chair 
of the Kamolot youth organisation 
for the city of Tashkent.250 Associate 
Professor at George Mason University 
Eric McGlinchey claims: ‘Modelled after 
the Soviet Komsomol, Kamolot is both 
an institution for the … government to 
exert centralized control, and a means 
for assimilating new cadres into the 
state bureaucracy’.251 He adds, ‘though 
registered as a non-governmental 
organization, it is in actuality one 
of the most expansive arms of the 
Uzbek government’. Second, Asamov 
is a member of the Liberal Democratic 
Party of Uzbekistan. A photograph 
posted to Facebook on 7 December 
2019 stated that Asamov is a candidate 
for election to the Jizzakh regional 
council, registered in the 18-Chulquvar 
electoral territorial unit. Third, Asamov 
previous acted as director of the state 
unitary enterprise known then as the 
Computerisation Centre. He left this 
posting in 2018 to become CEO of the 
BMB Group.
244 About Measures to Create a Modern Agricultural Cluster in Jizzakh Region, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Decree, No.PP-4009, 9 November 2018, 
available online: https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4147543  (accessed 29 February 2020)
245 ‘About’, BMB Trade Group, available online: www.bmb-tg.uz/site/about (accessed 29 February 2020); ‘Investment consulting company BMB Trade Group’, BMB 
Trade Group, no date, available online: www.bmb-tg.uz/uploads/eng%20bmb%20pdf.pdf (accessed 29 February 2020)
246 BMB Trade Group LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.1648, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 December 2019.
247 BMB Trade Group LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.1648, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 December 2019.
248 ‘About’, BMB Trade Group, available online: www.bmb-tg.uz/site/about (accessed 29 February 2020)
249 ‘Minister of Culture and Sports dismissed in Uzbekistan’, Radio Ozodlik, 19 October 2014, available online: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/26644829.html (accessed 
29 February 2020)
250 Makhmud Asamov, Facebook Profile, available online: https://www.facebook.com/makhmud.asamov.3 (accessed 29 February 2020)
251 McGlinchey, E. (2006) ‘Regeneration or degeneration? Youth mobilization and the future of Uzbek politics’, CDDRL Working Papers, June 2006, available online: 
https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/regeneration_or_degeneration_youth_mobilization_and_the_future_of_uzbek_politics (accessed 29 February 2020) 
On 9 November 2018 the President established a 2000 hectare 
cluster in the Pakhator district of Jizzakh, by decree.244 The 
cluster is a joint venture between US financial advisers, 
Silverleafe International LLC/Silverleafe Capital Partners, and 
the Uzbekistani conglomerate, BMB Trade Group. According to 
the decree, this cluster was established after the joint-venture 
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252 See https://www.silverleafe.uz/
253 Silverleafe Uzbekistan, 'About', available online: https://www.silverleafe.uz/english/about (accessed 20 March 2020)
254 On Measures to Implement the Investment Program of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2020-2022, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Decree, 
No.PP-4563, 9 January 2020, available online: https://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4689644 (accessed 2 March 2020)
255 Silverleafe Capital Partners LLC, Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration and Report by Exempt Reporting Advisers, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, CRD Number 133174, 5 March 2019, available online: https://reports.adviserinfo.sec.gov/reports/ADV/133174/PDF/133174.pdf (accessed 2 March 
2020)
256 Silverleafe Capital Partners LLC, Information Brochure, Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 February 2019, available online: https://files.adviserinfo.sec.
gov/IAPD/Content/Common/crd_iapd_Brochure.aspx?BRCHR_VRSN_ID=549622 (2 March 2020)
257 Silverleafe Capital Partners LLC, Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration and Report by Exempt Reporting Advisers, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, CRD Number 133174, 5 March 2019, available online: https://reports.adviserinfo.sec.gov/reports/ADV/133174/PDF/133174.pdf (accessed 2 March 
2020)
258 ‘ICT Minister receives delegation of Silverleafe Capital Partners’, Uz Daily, 23 March 2018, available online: https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/43184 (Accessed 
2 March 2020)
259 Sharipova, G. ‘What is the reason why 34 farmers in Pakhtakor district are indebted of 1 billion 300 million sums’, Kun.Uz, 27 April 2019, available online: 
https://kun.uz/uz/23413410 (accessed 2 April 2020)
Silverleafe has an Uzbekistani website.252 
However, it currently contains little 
substantive information. The website 
claims Silverleafe International LLC was 
established to oversee cotton cluster 
operations in Uzbekistan and declares 
that it is ‘bringing modern practices to 
Uzbekistan’. The company also notes 
it is ‘opportunistic’ and ‘focused on 
commerce’, but adds ‘we realize the 
important and strategic diplomatic role 
Uzbekistan plays within their Central 
Asian neighbourhood and their 
importance to the long-term security 
of the USA in our global fight against 
terrorism’.253
Silverleafe International LLC is 
incorporated in Delaware, a jurisdiction 
where beneficial ownership information 
is not available. It appears to be closely 
linked to Silverleafe Capital Partners 
LLC, which is also incorporated in 
Delaware. Uzbekistani government FDI 
data lists Silverleafe Capital Partners 
LLC as the formal investor in the cluster 
operated by Silverleafe International 
LLC.254 Silverleafe Partners  LLC’s 
principal, Dan Patterson, appears 
prominently on promotional literature 
for both organisations. 
As a registered investment adviser in the 
US, Silverleafe Capital Partners has to 
submit annual filings with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
According to the most recent filings 
the company has five employees, 
of which four perform investment 
advisory functions.255 The company 
manages assets valued at US$226,261,918 
on behalf of 47 high net worth individuals, 
and a further $32,024,479 on behalf 
of individuals. 
A 2019 brochure filed with the SEC states 
‘Silverleafe Capital Partners, LLC provides 
portfolio management and investment 
management to individuals, families 
and their related entities, trusts and 
estates, family businesses, charitable 
organizations, corporations, pension 
and retirement plans, and non-profit 
organizations... Silverleafe Capital 
Partners, LLC’s compensation is solely 
from fees paid directly by clients’.256
According to the brochure ‘Silverleafe 
Capital Partners, LLC does not 
participate in any other industry 
business activities’. 
SEC filings state that over 75% of 
Silverleafe Capital Partners is owned 
by William Daniel Patterson (Dan 
Patterson), John B Russel owns between  
10-24%, while 5-9% is held by James 
Mason Cousins and Broc Philip Kreitz.257 
In addition to being involved with the 
Pakhtakor cotton cluster, Silverleafe 
Capital Partners has been linked to the 
development of potential block-chain 
projects in Uzbekistan.258
Since Pakhtakor cluster began 
operations it has been the subject of 
criticism by stakeholders. Reporting 
from April 2019 states that farmers 
in the clusters have been unable to 
recover agreed costs from the cluster 
operator.259 Farmers allege that their 
concerns have been ignored by the 
company, and hokimiyat. 
On paper, this cluster joint-venture 
arguably exhibits a lower risk profile 
than others catalogued in this report. 
However, there are still factors which 
ought to prompt concern from a 
risk-perspective. In particular, the 
political ties of senior managers, the 
unique levels of state aid provided 
to the cluster, the involvement of a 
senior adviser with a reported track 
record of public malfeasance, concerns 
expressed by contracting farmers, the 
professional profile of the foreign joint-
venture partner (boutique financial 
adviser rather than textile industry 
leader), and the size of the investment 
(specifically, greater clarity is needed 
on the origin of the US$344 million).
A request for further information was 
submitted both to BMB Trade Group 
and Silverleafe Capital Partners. No 
response was received.
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V
The state-organised system of raw cotton production, because of its opaque 
characteristics, command-control methods, systemic labour abuses,  
and  long-term economic under-performance is now widely recognised to  
be broken. This judgement is shared by the Government of Uzbekistan. 
PART V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A rapid pivot to the privatisation of cotton 
production, through a value-added cluster approach, 
is now the preferred method to address under 
performance and abuse. However, the success 
of this strategy will depend on the governance 
framework, and the calibre of investors. 
This report points to serious shortcomings 
in both respects, which if not addressed will 
significantly reduce the cluster system’s 
impact. These shortcomings are symptomatic 
of wider challenges in the areas of public 
administration, corporate governance and rule 
of law, in Uzbekistan. Lack of transparency, weak 
governance requirements, and lax oversight 
mechanisms, works to the disadvantage of 
responsible business, and gives unfair advantage 
to companies using improper methods. 
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TO ADDRESS THESE CHALLENGES 
AT A GENERAL LEVEL, KEY 
RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE:
 Maintain a public register for 
incorporated legal entities that 
includes all historical and current 
filings relating to shareholdings, 
office holders, corporate 
governance, and financial returns. 
Require incorporated entities to 
declare beneficial owners and 
persons with significant control.
 Reform the companies law to 
strengthen reporting requirements, 
directors duties, and other 
mechanisms that can assure 
responsible business conduct. 
 Systematically enforce legal 
requirements to transparently and 
competitively procure private actors 
wishing to bid for government 
business, or to benefit from 
government administered business 
opportunities. 
 Ensure all procurement processes, 
and their outcomes, are published 
on a single unified database that is 
accessible to the public.
 Strengthen due diligence capacity 
and processes within government 
to ensure integrity when selecting 
businesses to benefit from state-
aid, state procurement, or state 
facilitated/initiated projects.
 Enforce legal rights to information.
IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THESE GENERAL 
REFORMS, RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE COTTON CLUSTER 
SYSTEM INCLUDE:
 Ensure all cluster operators are 
selected on an open, transparent 
and competitive basis, with the 
selection process and outcomes, 
published online in a form that is 
accessible to the public.
 Conduct rigorous due diligence 
during the selection process, to 
ensure only investors with a proven 
track record of responsible conduct 
are considered to operate clusters.
 Maintain rigorous oversight of 
cluster operators, looking at 
business performance, corporate 
integrity, labour relations, and 
environmental impact. Publish 
online all reviews of clusters, and 
the system more widely. 
 Publicly monitor regional 
monopolies enjoyed by cluster 
operators (to ensure no anti-
competitive practices are being 
used), strengthen tenure rights 
of farmers, and circumscribe the 
involvement of regional government 
and the Prosecutor-General in 
cluster operations. 
 Actively require cluster operators 
meet international best practice 
with respect to transparency, 
corporate governance and social 
responsibility.
Current government policy for 
improving the investment and business 
climate primarily focuses on taxation, 
ease of doing business, protection of 
property rights, and infrastructure.260 
Improving corporate governance, 
and enforcing public administration 
reforms, do not feature significantly 
in this published strategy. However, 
responsible domestic and international 
investors cannot compete in an 
environment where companies can 
obtain unfair advantage through 
abusive practices. While international 
apparel brands committed to responsible 
sourcing will also be deterred by a 
corporate governance environment 
lacking in basic integrity indicators. 
There is currently an acute risk in the 
cotton cluster system that such factors 
will defeat the economic and human 
rights impetus for the reform. Action 
is needed by government, cluster 
operators, investors, creditors, and civil 
society, to address this acute risk and 
to ensure the cotton-cluster system is 
able to deliver the policy aims marked 
out for it.
260 On Approval of the Investment Policy Strategy of the Republic of Uzbekistan until 2025, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Draft Decree, 
No.3394, 10 May 2019, available online: https://regulation.gov.uz/ru/document/3394 (accessed 2 January 2020)




UzInvestigations is a civic initiative administered 
by Ulster University in partnership with the Uzbek 
Forum for Human Rights. Drawing on data science, 
investigative methodologies, and digital analytics, 
UzInvestigations aims to publish resources and 
analysis that help to forensically scrutinise 
corporate and government power in Uzbekistan.  
Our aim is to promote transparency, good 
governance, human rights, and civic engagement.
www.uzinvestigations.org






T +44 (0) 28 9036 6248
D
es
ig
n:
 s
he
sa
id
.d
es
ig
n
